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Motivated by recent proceedings against best price clauses (BPCs) imposed by online
travel agents (OTAs), we empirically investigate the effects of such clauses using meta-
search price data of nearly 30,000 hotels in various countries.1 Under a BPC, an OTA
obliges the hotel not to offer better prices or conditions on other distribution channels
than on the OTA. Various national competition authorities in Europe agreed that best
price clauses could restrict competition between OTAs for commission rates, but eventu-
ally arrived at different assessments and decisions.2 These differences trigger the question
how BPCs actually affect the market outcome. The theoretical literature on this topic
is developing rapidly and shows that BPCs can harm consumers (Boik and Corts, 2016;
Edelman and Wright, 2015; Johnson, 2017; Wang and Wright, 2017), but can also be wel-
fare enhancing (see in particular Johansen and Vergé, 2017). However, empirical research
on this topic is yet very limited. With this article we start to fill the gap.
We exploit the variation in the BPCs due to different enforcement policies across various
countries and over time. The different national decisions seem to be due to differences
in the assessments rather than to fundamental differences in the market characteristics
in each country (see Hunold, 2016). For instance, the French competition authority had
accepted Booking.com’s commitments to narrow down the parity clauses in April 2015,
just to be overruled by the French parliament that completely prohibited BPCs of OTAs
in July 2015. These different decisions provide a quasi-experimental setup for assessing
the effects of different BPC policies.
Our focus is on analyzing how the abolition of a BPC has influenced on which distribution
channels hotels publish prices (OTAs and their direct channel) and the pricing of the
same hotel room across these channels. A BPC can restrict price differentiation as it
forbids hotels to charge higher room prices at the OTA imposing the clause than on other
channels covered by the clause (narrow BPCs cover only the direct channel, wide BPCs
also other OTAs)3. There are related clauses, such as availability requirements, which
1In this article, we generally refer to hotels as the typical accommodations on offer at a booking
platform. In its general terms and conditions, Booking.com uses the term “accommodation”. Other
types of accommodation present on OTAs include, for example, holiday apartments.
2See Annex IV for a list of the different decisions.
3Under a wide BPC, an OTA obliges the hotel not to charge a higher price on the OTA than on
almost any other booking channel, which in particular includes other OTAs and the hotel’s own direct
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further restrict a hotel’s sales strategy. If a hotel faces less parity restrictions, it might
thus price differentiate more across channels. In particular, a hotel could lower the prices
on its direct channel, where the marginal distribution costs are potentially lowest. A hotel
might also start using an OTA that has relaxed its parity clauses, and could start using
other channels which had been less attractive to use in view of these restrictions.
The main data source are price data from the website Kayak that covers the period Jan-
uary 2016 to January 2017. Kayak is a travel meta-search engine that displays the prices
of the same hotel room on different online distribution channels, in particular the OTAs
and the hotel website to which we refer as direct online channel. We complement this
data set with data from two additional sources. First, we add data from the OTA web-
site Booking.com, which allows us to distinguish between chain and independent hotels.
Second, we gathered time series data of travel related search queries from Google Trends.
These data date back before the beginning of our observation period and allow us to
control for other than BPC-related developments in the analyses.
Our empirical approach is twofold: In view of different BPC policies across countries, we
use cross-sectional statistics to investigate the channel choice and pricing across chan-
nels. Moreover, we analyze the removal of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany since
February 2016.4 By means of regression analyses, we compare the changes in the mar-
ket outcome in Germany with the changes in other countries without such a regulatory
treatment of the BPCs in the course of 2016.
We find that the price of the direct channel among hotel chains is more often strictly
lower than the prices on all other visible online sales channels following the abolition of
Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany. At the same time, the price at Booking.com is
less often the lowest among hotel chains in Germany. This suggests that Booking.com’s
BPC did restrict the hotels’ price setting. The result is consistent with a simple cost
based pricing in case that the hotel has lower distribution costs on the direct online
channel relative to the OTAs that typically charge commission rates for each mediated
booking. The result is also consistent with free-riding in the sense that hotels might use
sales channels. Narrow BPCs prohibit the hotel from publishing lower prices on its direct online sales
channels than at the OTA that imposes the clause. A narrow BPC does not contractually restrict the
hotel’s room prices at other OTAs.
4We also partly capture a legislative prohibition of BPCs in Austria.
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the OTAs to show their rooms, but induce customers with lower prices to eventually book
directly.
With respect to the availability of hotel room offers on different distribution channels,
we find that more hotels start using Booking.com as a distribution channel following the
abolition of Booking.com’s price parity and minimum availability clauses in Germany –
also relative to the developments in unaffected countries. This result suggests that a
fraction of the hotels indeed responds to parity clauses by not being active at an OTA
imposing them. Similarly, hotels that had already been active on Booking.com before
increasingly often publish prices there. Moreover, we observe a distinctive increase in the
availability of the direct online channel of chain hotels at Kayak in Germany, also relative
to other countries. This indicates that these hotels increasingly promote the direct channel
when they are not constrained by Booking.com’s narrow BPC.
In France and Austria, we partly observe similar developments as in Germany. In par-
ticular, we observe that in these countries more hotels have started using Booking.com
as a distribution channel. In Austria, hotels which had already been active at Book-
ing.com more often publish prices at this OTA. These patterns support the results we
have found in Germany as they can be related to changes in the BPCs in these countries.
The Austrian parliament passed a law in November 2016 that prohibits BPCs of OTAs
from January 2017 onward, following an intensive public debate and consultation process
in 2016. In France, all BPCs of OTAs had been prohibited in August 2015 with the Loi
Macron, and in November 2016 the commercial court in Paris also prohibited the OTAs
to use availability parity clauses.5
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature in
the next section, introduce the data and present descriptive statistics in Section 3, discuss
conjectures, methodology and identification in Section 4, show the analysis of the pricing
in Section 5 as well as price publications across channels in Section 6, present various
robustness checks in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.




Theory in relation to BPCs
Recent theoretical research investigates the theory of harm of various competition author-
ities that BPCs could restrict competition between OTAs for commission rates. Boik and
Corts (2016) analyze BPCs in a model in which customers can only purchase through a
platform, and not directly from the producers. The article concludes that when sellers
set the prices at which consumers buy at a sales platform (referred to as agency model,
which is typical for hotels and OTAs), BPCs lead to higher consumer prices. The reason
is that with BPCs in place the platforms have limited incentives to compete in the terms
of trade they offer to the sellers. This logic also reflects the main theory of harm of the
competition authorities in Europe (Hunold, 2016). Johnson (2017) and Foros et al. (2017)
show that platforms have incentives to adopt the agency model instead of the merchant
model. Their results also suggest that BPCs increase retail prices.
Another important feature of online hotel distribution is that hotels typically sell rooms on
direct channels such as their website. Edelman and Wright (2015) and Wang and Wright
(2017) directly address this by allowing customers to buy from either the platform or the
direct channel. Edelman and Wright (2015) find that platforms have excessive incentives
to invest in convenience benefits when there are BPCs and customers can also buy the
products directly from the sellers. Wang and Wright (2017) allow customers to search on
the platform and switch the sales channel to complete the transaction. They show that,
absent BPCs, the possibility of consumers to buy directly at a lower price disciplines the
platforms’ incentives to charge high commissions, but may make platforms unviable.
In contrast to the contributions above, Johansen and Vergé (2017) offer a divergent view
on the main theory of harm. They show that BPCs do not necessarily lead to higher
commission rates and consumer prices if hotels can decide whether to be active on the
OTA. Moreover, they conclude that narrow BPCs do not increase competition between
intermediaries when compared to wide BPCs. These findings could explain the observation
that commission fees of OTAs have apparently remained unchanged in Europe following
the move of Booking.com in 2015 to use only narrow BPCs.6
6In 2016, a HOTREC study finds that for more than 90% of all hotels the effective commission
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In summary, the theoretical literature provides arguments that BPCs might have various
anti-competitive effects, but there are also counter-arguments.
Empirical literature in relation to OTAs
It remains an empirical question whether and – if yes – how the wide and narrow BPCs
of OTAs affect the market outcome. To our knowledge, there are not yet any research
articles available which address this question.7 However, there is related research which
investigates online pricing and the role of online intermediaries.
In general, our article relates to studies that characterize online pricing. Cavallo (2017)
as well as Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017) report that there is considerable online
price dispersion for narrowly defined product categories and changes of prices occur more
frequently online than offline. Other studies that particularly address price dispersion
are Ghose and Yao (2011) and Zhao et al. (2015). They find that price dispersion is
prevalent in both list prices and transaction prices, but less so in the latter. We also find
considerable price dispersion across distributions channels and study how this is affected
by BPCs.
There are a few related papers that particularly address the role of intermediaries such as
OTAs and the relationship to retailers. De los Santos and Wildenbeest (2017) investigate
differences between the agency model and the merchant model in the e-book market.
They find that retail prices for e-books are significantly lower when the sales platforms
such as Amazon act as merchants and set the retail price. Ursu (2016) highlight the
importance of OTAs for the intermediation of hotel rooms by showing that in case of
Expedia a higher ranking of a hotel significantly increases the click-rate for that hotel.8
In a case study, Lu et al. (2015) find that the introduction of a new online direct sales
rates have not decreased over the past one year (see http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-
1714/dominant-online-platforms-gaining-market-share-in-travel-trade-no-signs-of-increased-competition-
between-online-travel-agents-unveils-european-hotel-distribution-study.aspx; last accessed December 1,
2017).
7Various European competition authorities conducted an evaluation of BPCs in hotel booking in
2016 using meta-search data. They find that price dispersion increased across OTAs following the re-
duction of price parity clauses. They do not address the direct channel as we do. We provided input
for this exercise in early 2016, including our research setup. See “Report on the Monitoring Exer-
cise carried out in the Online Hotel Booking Sector by EU Competition Authorities in 2016”, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf (last accessed December 1,
2017).
8In a related vein, Ghose et al. (2012) find that a high quality ranking of hotels can save consumers
up to about 9 USD per hotel booking.
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channel of a hotel chain in 2002 led to a significant reduction of the prices at physical
travel agents. This result suggests that there is competition between different forms of
sales channels for hotel distribution. Lu et al. do not study BPCs, which is the focus of
our study.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data sources
Prices and hotel characteristics from Kayak and Booking.com
We use data on prices of hotel rooms on different online sales channels such as Book-
ing.com, Expedia and the hotels’ direct online channel from the travel meta-search engine
Kayak.9 We understand that Kayak derives revenues from advertising placements on its
websites and mobile apps as well as from sending referrals to travel service providers,
OTAs, and hotels.10 Moreover, we understand that Kayak directly receives the hotel of-
fers from the OTAs that are available there and does not post own prices.11 Hotels can
submit offers of their direct online channel to Kayak, either with their own booking engine
or a third-party booking engine provider.12
A typical search request at Kayak requires a travel destination, the travel dates, the
number of travelers and the number of rooms as inputs, for instance two persons looking
for one room in Rome for an overnight stay in two weeks from today. In response to a
search request, Kayak displays a list of available hotels. For every hotel, Kayak lists the
prices of the available sales channels.13 We refer to the list of all available sales channels
9We use the German edition of the Internet site www.kayak.de. We have done anecdotal checks and
found that the offers which were available at Kayak.de were also available at Kayak websites in other
languages, such as Kayak.fr. Since 2013, Kayak is a subsidiary of the Priceline Group, which previously
also acquired the online travel agencies Booking.com (2004) and Agoda.com (2007).
10Priceline Group Inc. Annual Report 2015 (p.2). See http://ir.pricelinegroup.com/annuals.cfm; last
accessed December 1, 2017. Hotels report that they have to pay a monthly fee for having their direct
channel listed at Kayak, and also a fee whenever a Kayak user is forwarded to the hotels’ website. Source:
Phone interviews that we conducted with European hoteliers in 2016.
11Kayak sometimes presents a “Kayak” price. However, we found that this always corresponds to one
of the other posted offers of, for instance, Booking.com.
12Booking engines such as Fastbooking, Travelclick or Derbysoft offer the services necessary to connect
the hotel to Kayak.
13Also, Kayak sometimes includes itself in the list of hotel price offers. However, a click on the “Kayak
offer” redirects to OTAs which also belong to the Priceline Group such as Booking.com. Therefore,
whenever we observe a Kayak entry, we substitute it with the corresponding underlying Priceline OTA
and eliminate potential duplicates.
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for a particular hotel at a particular travel date as a Kayak request.
Kayak as a meta-search site redirects customers to the hotel website or the OTA websites.
Bookings then take place through these distribution channels. In the case that customers
choose an OTA to book a hotel room, it is important to note that the OTA typically
only acts as an intermediary between the hotel and customer while the hotels generally
set the prices at the OTAs. The best price clauses (if they exist) are specified in the
contracts between the hotels and the online travel agents. As a consequence, changes in
the BPCs, which are induced by national competition law enforcement or new laws, target
the contracts between the hotels in the respective jurisdiction and the affected OTA.14 In
order to study BPCs, we collect prices of hotels located in countries which differ in their
BPC policies.
There are three types of countries for which we collect data:15
1. Countries without BPCs:
(a) France (general prohibition of OTAs’ BPCs by law in July 2015)
(b) Germany (HRS prohibited in December 2013, Booking.com since February
2016; Expedia still has a narrow BPC)
(c) Austria (narrow BPCs since July 2015, prohibition by January 2017, this had
been subject to public debate already in 2016).
2. Narrow BPC countries: This includes nearly all other European Union (EU) member
states as regards the major OTAs Booking.com and Expedia (see exceptions above).
Our data captures mainly Italy and Sweden, as well as various cities close to the
German border.
3. Wide BPC countries: Today only non-EU countries as regards at least the major
OTAs Booking.com and Expedia. We have collected data for Canada.
We collect prices from Kayak for all listed hotels from a wide range of cities: the 25
biggest German cities, a list of the 15 biggest cities and 15 popular tourist destinations
14See for instance par 6.1 of the commitments given by Booking.com in April 2015 (last accessed
December 1, 2017) and point 1 of page 3 in the Bundeskartellamt’s decision against Booking.com (full
reference is in Annex IV).
15See Annex I for a detailed overview of countries and cities covered.
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for the five countries Austria, Italy, Sweden, France and Canada, as well as a selection
of 20 pairs of German and non-German cities near the German border. We collect data
from January 26, 2016 onward. The corresponding list of locations and starting dates for
data collection can be found in Annex I. Prices are collected for overnight stays for two
persons in one room on the same day and the 7th, 14th, 21th and 28th day ahead.16
For each hotel, Kayak also provides general information on room types, bed types, hotel
stars and booking conditions from the different distribution channels and displays them
to the customer when clicking on a particular hotel offer. We collect the data from the
overview page that lists all the available hotels in the cities of interest.
In addition to the price data from various distribution channels, the Kayak data also
contains hotel-specific characteristics. These include the hotel stars, and the Kayak cus-
tomer rating (from 0 to 10). Moreover, we obtain information on the number of rooms or
whether the hotel belongs to a chain from the respective hotel profile website on Book-
ing.com. The chain classification (including sub chains) distinguishes 884 distinct chains
in the cities that we study. All hotels not belonging to one of these chains are treated as
“independent”.17
It is possible that hotel chains have different distribution and marketing strategies, benefit
from economies of scale or react differently to contract changes. Moreover, hotel chains
potentially have more bargaining power towards OTAs and occasionally might be able
to negotiate contracts that differ from the standardized contracts between OTAs and
independent hotels. In order to account for the heterogeneity between these different
hotel types, we conduct the analyses separately for chain and independent hotels. We
discuss the concern of potential further unobserved heterogeneity and present robustness
checks in this regard in Section 7.
16On certain dates, we were able to collect prices for more travel dates than 0, 7, 14, 21 and 28 days
in advance of the booking date, e.g for all days within a 30 day period between booking and travel date,
but due to technical difficulties on some days we collected less data. In the analysis, only the observation
with travel dates 0, 7, 14, 21 and 28 days ahead are included.
17For a small fraction of the hotels, where no profile website was available on Booking.com, we con-
ducted analogously a manual classification into chain and independent hotels.
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OTA popularity and tourism flow measures from Google Trends
We also retrieve time series data from Google Trends for the time period from January
2015 to January 2017 to approximate 1) the popularity of different OTAs among cus-
tomers and 2) the tourism demand for hotels in particular cities. The data comprise the
aggregated search volume of specific queries on Google over time. Similar data have al-
ready been used as a predictor of actual tourism data in other studies (Coyle and Yeung,
2016; Siliverstovs and Wochner, 2018).
For the first purpose, we collect weekly country-specific data for search queries directed to
each of the OTA websites of Booking.com, Expedia and HRS.18 For the second purpose,
we retrieve weekly data for the worldwide search queries consisting of the keywords “City
Name + Hotel”.19 In order to validate the informative quality of the data, we gathered
monthly occupancy rates for all German cities in our sample from the regional statistical
offices. Accordingly, correlations with the corresponding Google Trends time series turn
out to be positive and significant. As an illustration, we plot both time series in Figure
1 for four cities. For our regressions, we then disaggregate each time series inferred from
Google Trends from a weekly to a daily level and merge by the search date of the Kayak
request and the country or city respectively.


























Jan 2016 Jul 2016 Jan 2017
Wilhelmshaven
Google Trends ("City Name" + "Hotel")
Occupancy Rate (Administrative Tourism Data)
18In the case of Expedia, Google Trends provides two options for websites to which search queries are
directed, which we both use and aggregate.
19For a few cities, where the search volume for this expression was so low that Google Trends does
not provide it, we collected data on the search query “City Name”.
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3.2 Summary statistics of the Kayak data
In this section we present summary statistics for the main variables of our analyses and
for the prevalence of the main distribution channels in the Kayak data. The observation
period ranges from January 2016 until January 2017 and the data set contains data from
around 30,000 hotels. Each observation in the data set refers to a hotel room at a specific
travel date which is on offer at a certain search date (which we refer to as Kayak request).
Every observation contains the price offers of all sales channels of the hotel as listed on
Kayak. In total, the data set consists of approximately 20 million observations.
Table 1 depicts summary statistics for a set of basic variables in our data for hotel chains
and independent hotels. The data are aggregated on the Kayak request level and on the
hotel level. A Kayak request includes on average 5 online sales channels (OTAs and direct
channel)20 and in 84% of all observations we find that hotels have published prices on at
least two channels.
Table 1: Basic variables by hotel type
Mean by hotel type All observations
Variable All Chain No chain Std. Dev. Min Max N
Kayak request level
Number of listings 4.93 7.06 4.11 3.14 1 24 20,115,292
At least two listings (%) 83.67 95.72 79.02 36.96 0 100 20,115,292
Mean price in EUR 120.37 128.41 117.27 95.89 10 2,000 20,115,292
Std. Dev. price 12.66 14.80 11.65 44.73 0 4,615 16,954,059
Strict minimum price exists (%) 48.11 51.69 46.43 49.96 0 100 16,830,677
Diff. (str.) two lowest prices (%) 13.71 9.35 15.98 47.08 0 16,100 8,164,931
Avg. days before travel date 12.74 12.59 12.80 9.63 0 28 20,032,766
Share of non-listed hotels (%) 63.89 60.37 65.25 15.79 0 100 20,073,996
Kayak hotel rating 7.97 7.90 8.00 0.87 2 10 19,810,437
GT city 76.67 77.60 76.32 15.12 4 100 20,115,292
GT Booking.com 63.50 65.26 62.82 15.53 32 100 20,115,292
GT Expedia 68.02 70.72 66.97 14.82 6 100 20,115,292
GT HRS 69.57 69.79 69.49 18.28 0 100 20,115,292
Hotel level
Number of rooms 52.08 123.55 31.83 74 1 1,590 27,123
Hotel chain (%) 20.50 100.00 0.00 40.37 0 100 29,497
Hotel category in stars 2.92 3.23 2.85 0.86 1 5 29,497
Kayak hotel rating 8.04 7.89 8.08 0.89 2 10 27,445
Number of ratings 628.42 1248.75 464.76 937.91 1 19515 28,564
The average price across all listings is at 120 EUR, ranging from 10 EUR to 2,000 EUR.21
The average standard deviation of the prices is 13 EUR for the Kayak requests with
20This is consistent with Stangl et al. (2016) who find that for Germany, Austria and Switzerland
hotels have published prices at 3.6 OTAs.
21We excluded prices below 10 EUR and above 2,000 EUR.
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offers from at least two distribution channels. In 48% of all observations with at least two
listings, there exists a strict minimum price.22 For the observations with a strict minimum
price, the average relative difference between the lowest and second lowest price is at 14%
of the lowest price. Moreover, Kayak displays for every city the number of available hotels
and the total number of hotels that are generally listed at Kayak. We use the fraction
of hotels that are currently not available at Kayak as one measure of hotel occupancy
in a city. It has an average value of 64% across all Kayak requests. The Google Trends
measures are normalized by the maximum of the search volume in the observation period
and scaled to values between zero and 100.
Hotel characteristics
We report characteristics of the hotels in the sample in Table 1.23 The average hotel has
52 rooms, 2.9 out of 5 stars24 and a Kayak rating of 8 out of 10.25 We identify 21% of
all hotels to belong to a hotel chain. Interestingly, 28% (not reported in the table) of
our Kayak requests come from chain hotels which shows that these hotels list on Kayak
more often. Accordingly, we find that chain hotels on average use more distribution
channels (on average 7 listings and in 96% of all cases at least two listings), are larger
(124 rooms) and of higher quality (3.2 stars). Interestingly, the differences in Kayak
hotel rating between chain hotels and independent hotels reveal that the customers are
slightly more satisfied with independent hotels even though these hotels have fewer stars
on average. Table 2 additionally compares the hotel features across distribution channels.
In each column it reports the average hotel feature for the group of hotels that have
used the particular distribution channel at least once. We observe that generally hotel
features are comparable across distribution channels. Especially the dimensions that
differ the most between hotel types exhibit less variation across distribution channels. In
particular, for the independent hotels, the average number of rooms ranges between 32
and 66 rooms and the average number of ratings ranges between 474 and 857 ratings
22Strict in the sense that the second lowest price is higher. We refer to the strictly lowest price of a
reponse to a Kayak request also as “price leader”.
23For these statistics each hotel has the same weight, which may not hold at the Kayak request level
because the number of observations per hotel can differ.
24Kayak also lists accommodations like holiday apartments without stars. We removed them from the
analyses.
25The information on the Kayak rating is only available for 85% of all hotels.
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per hotel across the distribution channels. In contrast, chain hotels on all distribution
channels are considerably larger (average number of rooms ranges between 123 and 137)
and also have a higher number of ratings, which ranges on average between 1259 and 1594
across distribution channels. This finding is an indication that it is generally useful to
distinguish between hotel types in order to consider more comparable hotel populations in
terms of observed (and unobserved) characteristics in the analyses. We further note that
when distinguishing between chain and independent hotels, the average characteristics of
the respective hotels across countries are quite similar (country statistics not reported).
Table 2: Hotel characteristics by platform and hotel type
Booking.com Expedia HRS Direct
Independent hotels
Number of rooms 32.10 37.23 48.17 66.33
Hotel category in stars 2.86 2.87 3.13 3.46
Kayak hotel rating 8.11 8.05 7.97 8.31
Number of ratings 474.03 599.34 749.16 856.56
Chain hotels
Number of rooms 123.45 126.81 136.26 137.82
Hotel category in stars 3.24 3.28 3.44 3.30
Kayak hotel rating 7.92 7.92 8.01 7.90
Number of ratings 1259.39 1291.25 1594.28 1281.99
Availability of price offers across channels
Table 3 depicts basic information on the availability of price offers across the main distri-
bution channels. In total, we observe 76 distinct sales channels in the Kayak data which
can be classified as OTAs and direct channels.26 We observe that hotels publish prices
most often at the OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS and the related OTAs of the
same company groups (see Annex V for details).
Booking.com is the channel that exhibits the highest penetration as 96% of all hotels
publish prices there at least once, followed by Expedia with 67% (Table 3, first data
column). Across the covered countries, 31% of all hotels make use of the OTA HRS. In
contrast, for Germany, around three quarters of all observed hotels had offers listed at
26For our analyses we take into account that some OTAs belong to the same company group (see
Annex V for details).
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least once at HRS. This can be attributed to the fact that HRS is a German incumbent.27
The high listing frequencies of the OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS are consistent
with a HOTREC survey from 2016 among more than 2,000 European hoteliers according
to which the three major OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS account together for
more than 90% of all bookings in Europe.28
Table 3: Channel use
Channel as displayed at Kayak
(major channels only)
Fraction of hotels
that used channel at
least once
Frequency of channel
use (given hotel used
it at least once)
Direct channel (total) 16% 87%
Direct channel (independent hotel) 5% 71%




Base All 29,497 hotels
observed during the
observation period
All Kayak requests of
hotels after hotels
have listed for the
first time
Kayak displays a direct channel price of a hotel and provides a link to the hotel’s own
website for approximately 16% of all hotels. Out of these hotels, about two thirds can be
identified as chain hotels, whereas the other third are independent hotels. Among the 20
million Kayak requests, a direct channel offer is contained in 17% (not reported) of all
requests on Kayak.
According to the Eurostat statistics on information and communication technologies use
in tourism, 74% of all enterprises in the accommodation sector in Europe had a website
that provided online ordering, reservation or booking opportunities in 2015. Therefore, it
is not guaranteed that the direct channel listing observed on Kayak is fully representative
27With respect to a comparison between countries, one further observes that Booking.com is the mostly
used channel with a frequency ranging from 84% in Italy to 94% in Sweden and Austria. Number two is
Expedia with frequencies from 45% in Austria to 83% in Canada. Compared to the channels Booking.com
and Expedia that are very prevalent in all countries of the data set, the presence of the German OTA
HRS varies more across countries. HRS is especially present in Germany (60%) and Austria (24%), while
it appears only in 3% of all Canadian Kayak requests. Note that these figures are per listing.
28Compared to the same survey conducted in 2013, bookings via OTAs have increased by 3 percentage
points (pp) to 22%. Direct bookings account in total for 55% of all bookings and have dropped by 4 pp
in the same time frame, while the direct online channel has remained approximately constant at close
to 7% (HOTREC Survey on Hotel Online Distribution, http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-
1714/dominant-online-platforms-gaining-market-share-in-travel-trade-no-signs-of-increased-competition-
between-online-travel-agents-unveils-european-hotel-distribution-study.aspx, last accessed December 1,
2017).
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for all hotels with direct online channels. However, it is also not obvious why hotels with
direct prices visible at Kayak should react in a systematically different way than other
hotels.
Direct prices of chain hotels are over-represented on Kayak in relation to direct prices of
independent hotels. In most of our analysis, we do distinguish between chain hotels and
independent hotels.
The hotels do not always post prices at OTAs or list direct channel offers at Kayak
(Table 3, second data column). A usage frequency of a channel below 100% arises if a
hotel occasionally does not offer hotel rooms on the particular channel on Kayak. As we
control for the date when a hotel starts to use a channel, these figures are a measure of
the hotels’ ability to react flexibly to changing market conditions on this channel. On
average, a hotel that is at least once listed with Booking.com or Expedia offers rooms
on the OTA in more than 90% of all Kayak requests. The direct channel of hotel chains
exhibits a similar frequency as OTAs, while the direct channel of independent hotels is
only used in 71% of all requests. Potentially, the lower listing frequency of independent
hotels can be explained by different technologies of transmitting information to Kayak.
Among all independent hotels that also list their direct channel on Kayak, more than 90%
employ a third-party booking engine provider. In contrast, we find that around 85% of
all chain hotels have their own booking engine to transfer data to Kayak (statistics by
transmission technology not reported).
In the next section we develop the conjectures and the identification strategy for the
empirical analysis.
4 Conjectures, identification and methodology
4.1 Conjectures
Pricing across channels
There are various reasons why a hotel might want to charge different prices on different
distribution channels. On the one hand, direct channel customers might have a lower price
elasticity than OTA customers as finding another hotel should be easier at an OTA. This
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could favor higher direct channel prices. On the other hand, the marginal costs of a hotel
for bookings on the direct channel are likely to be significantly lower than for bookings
through an OTA because of the per-booking commission.29 The “Book Direct” campaign
of HOTREC30 and similar measures of hotel associations indicate that hotels often favor
direct channel bookings and might thus prefer to charge lower direct channel prices. The
theoretical work of Shen and Wright (2017) confirms that when intermediaries (such as
OTAs) determine the commission fees that sellers pay per transaction, the sellers have
incentives to charge lower direct prices.
Both wide and narrow BPCs typically forbid hotels to have a lower price on the direct
channel than on the OTAs. We therefore expect that without a BPC in place the direct
channel has the strictly lowest price more often. We test
Conjecture 1. The hotel’s direct online channel has the strictly lowest price (is the price
leader) more frequently if the hotel faces no BPCs.
Decision on which channels a hotel publishes prices
A price parity clause requires the hotel to not charge lower prices on certain other channels.
Such a clause can make it unprofitable for some hotels to sign a contract with that OTA.
A reduction of the parity clauses could therefore induce more hotels to sign a contract
with the OTA at all and start publishing room prices there. Hence, we test
Conjecture 2. If an OTA stops using parity clauses, more hotels become active at the
OTA.
For those hotels that have used the OTA before, the removal of the BPC might have two
opposing effects. On the one hand, as a hotel is less constrained in its price setting, it
could find it profitable to use the less constrained distribution channel(s) more intensively.
In particular, it might have been unprofitable for the hotel to promote the direct channel
when the hotel could not make the channel more attractive by means of a lower price.
29Booking.com (and other major OTAs) typically act as “agents” for the hotels. In this agency
business model, the customer formally does not purchase the hotel service from Booking.com, but does
so from the hotel directly. Moreover, the hotel is responsible for the price setting on the OTA as on all
other distribution channels. In return the OTA receives a commission payment from the hotels for every
mediated booking.
30See http://www.hotrec.eu/bookdirect.aspx; last accessed December 1, 2017.
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Conjecture 3. More hotels use the direct channel and make it visible at Kayak more
often if they face less (stringent) parity clauses.
On the other hand, we understand that the parity also requires some form of room avail-
ability.31 If the availability requirements exceed the number of offers a hotel would like
to offer on the OTA, one might expect that a hotel offers rooms less often at an OTA
once it is allowed to do so. On the contrary, a hotel might nevertheless be inclined to
use the OTA more frequently following the removal of the BPC because it can now also
differentiate between the other channels (in particular the direct channel) and that OTA
channel by means of a lower direct price – instead of not listing at the OTA at all. We
therefore test
Conjecture 4. Hotels publish offers more frequently at an OTA if the OTA does not use
parity clauses.
4.2 Identification and methodology
As a first step, we investigate the pricing Conjecture 1 by means of cross-sectional statistics
which capture differences across countries. In particular, we compare prices between
channels in case of wide BPCs (as in Canada) with those in case of narrow and no BPCs
(as in Europe). The identifying assumption here is that differences across countries are
due to the different BPC regimes. We cannot exclude, however, that there are also other
country-specific differences which affect the pricing across channels and the publishing of
hotel offers online.
To account for country-specific differences, we test all our conjectures by investigating the
effects of the latest prohibition decision in Germany, which was taken by the competition
authority in December 2015 against Booking.com, with the obligation for Booking.com
to remove the narrow BPC by February 2016.32 In particular, we compare a change in
certain market outcomes in Germany with changes in other countries where the BPC
policies did not change in 2016.
31Even Booking.com’s narrow BPCs require from the hotel to make a minimum allocation of rooms
on the OTA website available.
32See Annex IV for an overview of the decisions.
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We are not aware of other relevant regulatory changes for the investigated jurisdictions
during our observation period. We have checked for relevant changes in taxation for our
investigated countries by means of the IBFD tax research platform. There have been
(slight) changes in the value added tax for accommodations in Austria in May 2016 and
the corporate taxation in Italy in January 2017. To the extent that they apply to hotels,
these should only affect a hotel’s profit after taxes slightly and independently of the
distribution channels used. As a consequence, these changes should have no significant
impact on the participation of hotels in sites such as Booking.com and the pricing across
distribution channels.
While we are not aware of any policy change in Canada, there have, however, been
changes in the BPC policies in Europe before 2016. Across the whole European Union,
Booking.com reduced the scope of its BPCs from “wide” to “narrow” by July 2015.33
This took place well before our observation period and if it had an effect at all, it should
have affected all European member states equally. In case of France, the parliament in
addition prohibited BPCs of all OTAs in the summer of 2015. We therefore compare the
developments in Germany with the developments in the countries of the control set one
by one. By showing that the developments of our dependent variables are distinctively
different from the developments in all (or at least most) of our control countries, we are
confident that our results are not driven by certain other developments in a particular
control country.
In our main specification, we compare the trends in the market outcome in Germany
in the course of 2016 with the trends in other countries without such a change of the
BPCs. Our identifying assumption for this approach is that the difference-in-trends34 can
be attributed to the removal of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany and that there
are no other country-specific developments since January 2016 which affect the pricing
across channels and the publishing of hotel offers online, except for demand and OTA
popularity, which we control for with the following variables:
33See footnote 3.
34This closely resembles a difference-in-differences approach as a trend is a difference over time. Be-
cause of the short pre-treatment period, we rely on the null hypothesis is that the trends in the different
countries over one year should not vary systematically from the German trend if the change in the BPC
regime in Germany has no effect. In Annex VIII we provide evidence that a standard difference-in-
differences specification yields qualitatively the same result.
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1. The share of non-listed hotels at the city-level, according to Kayak, which approx-
imates the occupancy rate at the travel date from the perspective of the search
date,
2. the worldwide search volume for hotels in each city of our data set on Google, as an
approximation for actual demand at the search date, and
3. the country-specific search volume for each of the three main OTAs on Google, which
accounts for a potential different development of the popularity among customers.
We conduct various auxiliary analyses to ensure that we correctly identify the effects of
the removal of the BPC in Germany (see Section 7 for details):
1. We address the concern that within-year changes could be due to a particular sea-
sonality in Germany by analyzing the development over a year, both by means of
a linear trend over the period of January 2016 to January 2017 as well using two-
months-country-fixed effects and comparing the base period of the beginning of 2016
with the fixed effect of the first month in 2017.
2. We analyze short term changes in Germany relative to the other countries. The
closeness in time between the policy change in and distinct changes in the dependent
variables can be seen as an indication of a causal relationship.
3. As we only have a short pre-treatment period in the detailed Kayak data, we addi-
tionally study time series which go back to the years before 2016 to rule out that
Germany is on a different long term trend than the control countries.
For the main regressions, we estimate several equations of the following kind:






Xi,c,t,d + εi + ǫi,c,t,d, (1)
where i denotes the hotel, c the country (which is constant for each hotel), t the travel
date and d the booking date (when appropriate). The dependent variable yi,c,t,d is a
dichotomous variable. Depending on the conjecture to be tested, this is an indicator
of a certain channel having the lowest price or of the availability of a hotel offer on a
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channel. We measure changes over time in our reference country (Germany) by including
a linear trend. To capture diverging developments in other countries, we interact this
trend variable with indicator variables for other countries (Ic).
The vector X controls for other time-varying factors. If not stated differently, we include
as control variables the time interval between booking date and travel date, the weekday
of the first travel day, the rating of the hotel as it is displayed at Kayak. To control for
demand and OTA popularity, we also include the share of non-listed hotels for that travel
date in the city where the hotel is located and the Google Trends time series, as discussed
above.
We control for time-constant heterogeneity between hotels by means of hotel fixed effects
εi. For instance, factors like the hotel size or the hotel’s sales strategy might influence
where a hotel publishes prices and how it sets prices across channels. To the extent that
the influence stays constant in the course of our observation period, it is captured by the
hotel fixed effects. This leaves us with the within-hotel variation. As a consequence, other
time-constant observed variables such as hotel stars or the country are not included in
the regression analyses.35
As we also observe whether a hotel belongs to a hotel chain or is an independent hotel,
we explicitly allow for heterogeneity between these different types of hotels. For our main
analyses, we therefore conduct the fixed effects regressions separately on the population of
chain hotels and independent hotels in order to identify hotel-type-specific developments.
For the analysis of changes in the general availability of hotels on specific channels over
time, we slightly change model (1) and estimate the following model:






Xi,c,t + εi + ǫi,c,t. (2)
In model (2), the subscript d is dropped as we aggregate the observations to the hotel-
month-level such that we have one observation for hotel i in country c in month t. Cor-
respondingly, vector X contains only the average monthly share of non-listed hotels in
this month in the corresponding city, the aggregated hotel rating in this month and the
monthly averages of the Google Trends data.
35As a robustness test, we run regressions without fixed effects in Annex VII.
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Due to the high computational effort in case of fixed effects, we conduct the regressions on
dichotomous indicator variables with the linear probability model (LPM) rather than with
an index model such as probit and logit. Although such a non-linear model is theoretically
a more rigorous approach, we follow Wooldridge (2010) that the LPM often yields good
estimates of the partial effects on the response probability. We compute standard errors
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation at the hotel-level.36
5 Pricing across channels
5.1 Cross-sectional observations
Finding 1: The direct channel price is more often below the Booking.com price
in Germany and France (largely no BPCs) than in Canada (wide BPCs).
To investigate the pricing across distribution channels, we first compute how often the
direct channel price is strictly below or above the price of the major OTAs at the country-
level. Table 4 shows for each country and hotel type the share of Kayak requests in which
the Booking.com price is above the direct channel price (B>D) and vice versa (D>B).37
The share of observations with price parity (D=B) is implicitly given as 100% minus both
shares. We group the countries by BPC regime. The numbers in parentheses show for
each country the number of Kayak requests in which both Booking.com and the direct
channel are listed.
The price relation is possibly measured with some error, although we have not found any
indication of a systematic measurement error.38 A potential error may thus materialize
in both directions (B>D versus D>B) with the same likelihood. On this basis, we can
compute a conservative measure of the frequency of the event (D<B), called difference,
by subtracting the fraction of Kayak requests in which the direct price is larger than
Booking.com (D>B) from the fraction in which the direct price is smaller than the Book-
36As a robustness check, we have computed standard errors also at the city level and the country-chain
level, but found that our main results were mainly unaffected.
37The analogous computations for the relation between the direct channel and Expedia as well as HRS
yield similar results.
38See Section 7 and Annex II for details.
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ing.com price (B>D). The difference leaves us with a lower bound of the frequency with
which hotels price the direct channel cheaper than Booking.com, which would materialize
if all observed (D>B) cases were due to an unsystematic error.
Table 4: Relation between Booking.com and direct channel
Chain No Chain
Country B>D D>B Difference B>D D>B Difference
No BPC
Germany* (n=648,620) 31.4 14.7 16.4 65.4 16.8 48.6
France (n=1,086,796) 28.9 18.1 10.8 65.0 15.4 49.6
Narrow BPC
Italy (n=359,831) 31.4 22.5 8.9 55.2 19.9 35.3
Sweden (n=129,203) 41.5 23.9 17.6 52.1 29.9 22.2
Austria** (n=143,145) 31.0 21.2 9.8 52.6 21.3 31.3
Others (n=165,736) 35.9 26.2 9.7 37.8 26.5 11.3
Wide BPC
Canada (n=676,509) 29.2 32.8 -3.6 34.7 33.0 1.4
The column variables indicate the share of Kayak requests (in %) for which the particular relation
(e.g. B>D) holds. The net effect is the difference between the two numbers to control for potential
measurement errors. *Booking.com removed the narrow BPC in February 2016. **In Austria, narrow
BPCs were in place until December 2016.
Table 4 shows that in Canada this difference – taken as a conservative measure of the
fraction with a lower direct channel price – is at minus 3.6% for hotel chains and at 1.4%
for independent hotels. This suggests a possibly high compliance towards wide BPCs in
Canada.39 In contrast, in countries where no BPCs are in place the aggregated measure of
a lower direct channel price is considerably higher and between 16% for France and 20%
for Germany (aggregated values not reported in the table). This comparison confirms
Conjecture 1 that the direct channel is more frequently below the price at an OTA if no
BPC is in place.
Table 4 also shows that in the countries with narrow BPCs the direct channel is more
often cheaper than Booking.com. This observation strongly suggests that direct channel
prices covered by a narrow BPC are below the price at Booking.com in a considerable
number of cases. The fact that we do not observe similar results for the narrow BPC
39A certain degree of non-compliance even in case of wide BPCs is plausible. For instance, the
monitoring report of various European competition authorities states that “evidence from the NCA
antitrust cases suggests that many hotels did not fully comply with their parity obligations under wide
parity” (fn. 17 therein).
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countries as for Canada suggests that OTAs in these countries cannot enforce price parity
between the direct channel and the OTA in the same way as it is feasible in Canada.
This observation is interesting as one might expect the same compliance in relation to
the direct channel price under a narrow and a wide BPC because both restrict the direct
channel price not to be lower than the OTA price. Less compliance in case of narrow
BPCs might be due to other restrictions that are relaxed in the narrow parity clauses of
Booking.com, such as limited punishments in case of non-compliance. The competition
policy cases run against Booking.com might have also weakened the enforcement power
of Booking.com.
The comparison between chain hotels and independent hotels indicates that the direct
channel is more often cheaper than Booking.com among independent hotels, which sug-
gests a lower compliance with parity clauses of the latter. Moreover, according to our
data, independent hotels in Germany and France – where Booking.com was not allowed
to use parity clauses anymore in our observation period – price the direct channel cheaper
than Booking.com most often.
Finding 2: Kayak shows one channel as price leader across sales channels in
about half of all observations.
For Kayak requests with prices from at least two channels, Table 5 displays the cross-
sectional frequencies of the event that the second lowest price is strictly higher than
the lowest price (existence of a strict price leader). The absolute numbers should be
interpreted very cautiously as they might suffer from measurement error, similar to the
price relations presented before.
It is more insightful to compare the figures across countries as this is robust to unsystem-
atic data errors (for instance due to delayed updating of prices by Kayak). An interesting
observation is that the direct channel of independent hotels is the price leader more of-
ten in countries where OTAs largely do not have best price clauses, foremost France and
Germany (data column 4). The fraction is also relatively high in Austria, where the legal
prohibition was arguably already foreseeable for hotels in the course of 2016. Moreover,
the direct channel is by far least often the price leader in the wide BPC country Canada.
This finding is consistent with Conjecture 1. For chain hotels, the pattern is similar in
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that France has the highest share of direct price leadership and Canada the lowest frac-
tion, but the shares are more similar and overall the pattern is less clear (data column
3).
Table 5: Share of Kayak requests with price leader and frequency of direct channel and
Booking.com as price leader by chain
Existence price leader Share direct channel Share Booking.com
Country Share Deviation Chain No chain Chain No chain
No BPC
Germany* (n=4,169,477) 39.4 10.9 10.7 41.8 5.3 12.3
France (n=4,741,024) 48.9 9.2 15.0 42.2 8.4 15.1
Narrow BPC
Italy (n=6,327,717) 50.0 19.6 8.4 27.8 6.5 24.1
Sweden (n=596,213) 44.2 10.1 10.8 18.6 12.2 14.5
Austria** (n=1,032,744) 50.2 12.6 10.2 39.5 8.3 23.8
Others (n=1,416,241) 57.8 17.8 11.6 14.6 9.6 24.9
Wide BPC
Canada (n=1,831,876) 53.1 10.3 9.0 10.4 10.7 23.4
The first two columns indicate the share of Kayak requests with at least two listings (in %)
with a strict price leader (1) and the the average relative deviation to the second lowest
price (2). Columns 3 to 6 show by hotel type how frequently the direct channel and Booking.com
are the price leader among the requests in which they are listed. *Booking.com removed the narrow
BPC in February in 2016. **In Austria, narrow BPCs were in place until December 2016.
In order to control for potential time-constant country and hotel-specific differences across
BPC regimes, we analyze the effects of Booking.com’s removal of the narrow BPC in
Germany on the price leadership of the direct channel and Booking.com in the next
subsection.
5.2 Effects of Booking.com’s removal of the narrow best price
clause in Germany on pricing
Finding 3: The direct price of chain hotels in Germany is increasingly often
the strictly lowest online channel price.
According to Conjecture 1, the hotels’ direct online channel should more often have the
strictly lowest price on offer (price leader) following the removal of the narrow BPC of the
largest OTA Booking.com. In Germany, the formerly largest OTA HRS had already been
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prohibited to use any BPC in 2013, whereas the investigation of the narrow BPCs of the
third largest OTA Expedia is still ongoing. For hotels that do business with Expedia, a
narrow BPC might therefore still be in place and would formally not allow them to offer
a lower direct price. However, our anecdotal evidence – derived from several phone calls
with hoteliers in Germany in 2016 – suggests that hoteliers might not respect Expedia’s
clause very much in view of the ongoing investigation and the previous prohibitions against
HRS’s wide and in particular Booking.com’s narrow BPCs.
Table 6 displays regression results separately for chain hotels and independent hotels.
The dependent variable is equal to 100 if the direct channel (first and third data column)
or Booking.com (second and fourth data column) has the strictly lowest price on offer,
and is 0 otherwise. The linear country-specific trend captures whether the particular
distribution channel becomes price leader more often. For the regressions we only include
observations of hotels that have used the particular channel already at the beginning
of the observation period and Kayak requests that contain a Booking.com and a direct
channel listing.40
In Germany, there is a positive trend of the direct channel of chain hotels being the price
leader (0.36 pp per month, see Table 6, data column 3). For all other countries the
coefficients indicating the difference from the German trend are negative, with particu-
larly large and significant values for France, Italy and Sweden. For Austria, which has
gone through the process of a legislative prohibition of the BPCs in 2016, there is no
significantly different trend from Germany. We obtain the same result for Canada. By
contrast, for the independent hotels (data column 1) there is no significant time trend
with respect to the direct channel. Recall that independent hotels in Germany on average
price the direct channel relatively often lowest (Table 5), and in particular below their
price at Booking.com (Table 4). It might therefore be that these hotels are generally less
compliant than chain hotels and therefore responded less strongly in their pricing to the
removal of the narrow BPC of Booking.com.
While the direct channel is more often the price leader within the group of chain hotels,
we find that Booking.com is significantly less often the price leader (minus 0.20 pp per
40For all countries except of Austria the beginning of the observation period is defined as hotels that
have used the particular channel already in February 2016. As the data collection for Austria started
later, we extend this time frame for Austria until April 2016.
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month, data column 4) among these hotels in Germany. In particular, this development is
different in France, Italy and Canada, where the frequency of Booking.com as price leader
does not decrease. As regards the price leadership of Booking.com among independent
hotels, the regression results suggest that these hotels on average price Booking.com more
often lowest (0.46 pp per month, data column 2). However, this trend in Germany in
itself only weakly significant and not significantly different from the trend in various
other countries, including Italy and Sweden.
If we pool all hotels together, the result that the direct channel becomes the price leader
significantly more often in Germany prevails, while Booking.com is the price leader sig-
nificantly less often (see Annex VII, Table 24 and 25 for details).
Chain hotels set the strictly lowest price on their direct online channel more often and less
often on Booking.com when more hotels in their city are not listed. They also set more
often a strictly lowest price - both on the direct channel and Booking.com - when demand
is high (as measured by GT city). The respective results for independent hotels are less
conclusive, as coefficients are partly not significantly different from zero. However, the
popularity of Booking.com (measured by GT Booking.com) affects for both hotel types
the likelihood of setting a strictly lowest price on Booking.com positively.
In additional robustness analyses, we observe that the direct channel is more often the
price leader, even if we define a price leader to have a discount of at least 5 percent to
the second lowest price. This result lets us conclude that the hotels that are inclined to
change their price setting do so up to a price adjustment of 5 percent. For an average price
of 120 EUR in our data, this means that the direct channel is more often 6 EUR or even
more below the second lowest price. The result on the price leadership of Booking.com
is only robust to a threshold of 1 percent. However, note that the event of an OTA price
being for instance 5 percent below the second lowest price is not really influenced by the
abolition of a narrow BPC.41
41More specifically, following a suggestion of a referee, we have rerun the regressions with a more
restrictive definition of price leadership. In particular, we defined a price leader only if it the corresponding
price was at least 1% (5% and 10%) lower than the second lowest price. The corresponding results are
available upon request.
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Table 6: Channel has the strictly lowest price
No chain Chain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Booking.com Direct Booking.com
Trend (Base: Germany) −0.68 0.46∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.26) (0.09) (0.04)
∆ Trend France 0.39 −0.39 −0.77∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.28) (0.11) (0.06)
∆ Trend Italy 1.44∗ −0.37 −0.58∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.78) (0.30) (0.16) (0.08)
∆ Trend Sweden −1.05 −0.21 −1.61∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.97) (0.33) (0.30) (0.12)
∆ Trend Austria 0.49 −0.89∗∗ −0.31 −0.21∗∗
(0.80) (0.35) (0.20) (0.10)
∆ Trend Canada 0.21 −0.75∗∗ −0.17 0.18∗∗
(0.63) (0.32) (0.11) (0.08)
∆ Trend Other countries 0.16 −0.07 −0.23 0.36∗∗
(0.66) (0.31) (0.21) (0.16)
Share of non-listed hotels 0.01 0.02 0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating −4.00 3.66∗∗ 1.61 1.67∗
(3.03) (1.47) (1.11) (0.98)
GT city −0.02 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GT Booking.com −0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
7 days before −1.60∗∗∗ −1.49∗∗∗ 0.06 −1.64∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.25) (0.17) (0.14)
14 days before −1.34∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗ −0.14 1.16∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.29) (0.18) (0.17)
21 days before −0.25 −1.55∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ −2.04∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.30) (0.22) (0.16)
28 days before 0.05 −2.20∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ −3.71∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.32) (0.23) (0.18)
Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 481,064 495,315 2,486,955 2,408,906
R2 0.466 0.202 0.388 0.137
Adjusted R2 0.465 0.201 0.387 0.136
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) not reported. Only observations of hotels
included that have used the particular channel already at the beginning of the
observation period and that contain a direct channel and Booking.com listing.
Dependent variables are equal to 100 if particular channel is price leader and 0
otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Taken together, the regression results are consistent with Conjecture 1 in that the direct
channel in Germany is becoming the price leader more often in response to the removal
of Booking.com’s narrow BPC. At the same time, the OTA Booking.com, is less often
the price leader in Germany. The finding that the direct channel becomes the price
leader more often is driven by the chain hotels which we found to be more compliant in
general. For this group of hotels, we find that only around 6 percent of the observations
from Germany have listed the direct channel as a price leader at the beginning of the
observation period. The regression results suggest that this fraction increases by 4.32 pp
throughout the observation period. This implies an increase of 70 percent in observations
with a direct price leader compared to the level of the beginning of 2016.
6 Analysis of hotel room availability across channels
In this section we study the effects of Booking.com’s removal of the narrow best price
clause in Germany on the availability of online price offers. Across all the countries in
our data, the frequency of price publications at Booking.com increases over time (Figure
2). This indicates Booking.com’s growing importance in online hotel distribution. The
frequency in Germany starts from an average level of around 73% and exhibits a drastic
increase at the beginning of the observation period.42
We analyze below whether the increased listing frequency can be attributed to the abo-
lition of Booking.com’s BPC in Germany, as the implied less restrictive contract terms
might make it more attractive for hotels to list on Booking.com. The following regressions
address the intensive and extensive publication decisions (Conjectures 2, 3 and 4).
42During November 2016 one can observe a drop of around 10% in the frequency of Booking listings for
Germany. We understand from hoteliers that technical problems with the interface occurred during this
period, which could explain the temporary non-availability of hotels as shown in our data. Additionally,
a new API by Booking.com was rolled out in this month, which could also have had an impact.
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Figure 2: Booking.com listing frequency at Kayak by country
Finding 4: More hotels make price publications at Booking.com in Germany
following the removal of the narrow BPC (extensive margin).
According to Conjecture 2, a reduction in the scope of a BPC should yield an increase in
price publications at the extensive margin, especially for the OTA that narrows down its
BPC. This can be tested for Germany where Booking.com had to waive its narrow BPC
from February 2016 onward.
Again, we test this conjecture separately for chain and independent hotels. For this
analysis we use a data set where each observation corresponds to a hotel in a specific
month. The dependent variable equals 100 if a particular channel (such as Booking.com)
was used by the hotel at least once in that month according to the Kayak data, and 0
otherwise. The linear country-specific trend captures whether hotels use the channel in
later months but not early in 2016 (extensive use). The hotel rating, the Google Trends
data and the share of non-listed hotels are aggregated to the monthly average for the
respective hotel or destination.43 We report the regression results in Table 7.
43The control variables for the time interval between booking and travel date and the weekday of the
first travel day are not included.
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Table 7: Extensive channel use (at least once in a month)
No chain Chain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Booking.com Direct Booking.com
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.09∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 0.01 2.01∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11)
∆ Trend France 0.04 −0.65∗∗∗ 0.08 −1.35∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12)
∆ Trend Italy −0.13∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.15 −0.89∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.17)
∆ Trend Sweden −0.01 −1.89∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −2.09∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
∆ Trend Austria −0.09 −0.91∗∗∗ 0.26∗ −1.51∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
∆ Trend Canada −0.10∗ −1.77∗∗∗ −0.04 −1.91∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.14∗∗∗ −1.70∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.13)
Avg. share of non-listed hotels −0.00 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.12∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Avg. Kayak hotel rating 0.23 1.79∗∗∗ 0.87 0.48
(0.19) (0.54) (0.98) (1.29)
Avg. GT city 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Avg. GT Booking.com −0.00 0.15∗∗∗ −0.01 0.13∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Weekdays No No No No
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 212,673 212,673 70,716 70,716
R2 0.874 0.523 0.950 0.483
Adjusted R2 0.859 0.467 0.946 0.435
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) not reported. Dependent variable is equal to 100 for
all months in which a hotel used the particular channel at least once and 0 otherwise.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The second and fourth data column of Table 7 show a positive trend in the share of
hotels in Germany using Booking.com at least once in each month. The share increases
on average by 1.7 pp per month for independent hotels and by 2 pp per month for chain
hotels. The coefficients on the interactions of the time trend with the other countries (i.e.
the deviations from the German trend) are significantly negative (except for one case of
insignificance). These time trends are thus less pronounced for the other countries, where
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no change in the BPC regime took place in the investigated time frame. The negative and
significant deviations (in absolute values) from the German trend range from 0.65 pp in
France (independent hotels) to approximately 2 pp in Canada and Sweden (chain hotels).
As a result, in these countries the trend of Booking.com’s extensive price publications is
close to zero.
The significant and positive coefficient on the extensive direct channel use of 0.09 pp
for independent hotels in data column 1 might allude to the fact that Booking.com’s
narrow BPC indeed put a constraint on the direct channel. After its abolition, it might
be reasonable for more independent hotels to engage in direct online sales. For chain
hotels we do not find an increase in the extensive direct channel use (possibly because
they marketed the direct channel already more actively before).
The regressions on the extensive channel use of Booking.com confirm Conjecture 2: There
is a significant positive trend in the extensive channel use of Booking.com following the
removal of its narrow BPC in Germany. This trend is significantly stronger than in the
other countries. The regression results suggest that this increase is at 20.1 (24.1) pp for
independent hotels (chain hotels) in Germany. To put this into perspective, we relate this
increase to the extensive Booking.com use in Germany at the beginning of the observation
period in Germany, which is around 75 percent. In relation to the implied increase of
extensive Booking.com use, this suggests that extensive Booking.com use has increased
by 26.4 (31.7) percent for independent hotels (chain hotels) in Germany compared to the
initial level at the beginning of 2016.
The direct sales channel of independent hotels in Germany also seems to be positively
affected by the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC (although the development is less
Germany-specific). That we observe a rather strong increase in fraction of hotels using
Booking.com at all is in line with the argument underlying Conjecture 2 that hotels are
now particularly more willing to register with this OTA as they are not constrained by
its BPC anymore.
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Finding 5: Hotels make price publications more frequently at Booking.com
following the removal of the narrow BPC (intensive margin).
We now analyze the intensive channel use of Booking.com and the direct channel. We
measure the intensive channel use as the frequency with which prices for a hotel on a
particular channel are available in those Kayak search responses with at least one price
offer for that hotel. We conduct the analysis of hotels for which we observe prices on this
channel already at the beginning of the observation period in the Kayak data. According
to Conjectures 3 and 4, we expect that BPCs lead to less frequent price publications,
both at the OTA using the clause as well as at channels covered by the clauses. In
Germany, Booking.com had to abolish its narrow BPC that explicitly only restricted the
price setting on the direct online channel. As a consequence, the removal of the BPC
should increase the frequency at Booking.com and the presence of direct prices at Kayak
because hotels can use these distribution channels now more flexibly.
We test this conjecture with separate regressions for each of the channels. The dependent
variable equals 100 if the channel price is shown in response to the Kayak request, and
0 otherwise. Again, we split the sample into hotel chains and independent hotels and –
as mentioned above – only include observations of hotels which have used the respective
channel already at the beginning of the observation period.44 This measures whether
the channel is used more intensively in later months than early in 2016. Note that we
control for the hotel rating, OTA popularity according to Google as well as local supply-
demand balance by means of the share of non-listed hotels at Kayak and the Google
Trends measure of the destination popularity.
We find that both independent and chain hotels increase the frequency of price publica-
tions at Booking.com significantly over time in Germany (Table 8 data columns 2 and
4). The negative deviations from the Germany trend suggest that the changes in the
intensive use of Booking.com are weaker in most of the other countries. An exception is
Austria, where trend in intensive channel use of Booking.com is significantly stronger for
both types of hotels. These results might indicate that Austrian hotels undergo a similar
development as in Germany as narrow BPCs were in the public legislative process of being
prohibited in Austria in 2016. Interestingly, the popularity measure for the OTA Book-
44See footnote 40.
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ing.com indicates that hotels of all types particularly rely on this distribution channel in
destinations and at times in which many (potential) customers search for hotel rooms via
Booking.com. Accordingly, in these instances the direct channel is used less intensively.
For the direct channel of independent hotels we do not see a trend in Germany that
is statistically different from zero. However, we observe negative significant coefficients
for France and Italy. In contrast, for the direct channel of chain hotels we find that
the listing frequency increases significantly by 0.4 pp per month (data column 3). The
coefficients for the deviations in the other countries are mostly significantly negative.
For the direct channel of hotel chains we observe statistically significant deviations from
the German trend in France, Sweden and Canada. The trends in Austria and Italy are
not significantly different from the German trend, indicating similar developments as in
Germany. Hence, this confirms Conjectures 3 and 4 for the chain hotels (and partly also
for the independent hotels) because especially the hotel chains harness the less restrictive
contract terms in order to offer hotel rooms more frequently at Booking.com and their
direct channel (as it is visible at Kayak).
Taken together, the regression results confirm Conjectures 3 and 4 by indicating that the
abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC is related to an increase in the intensive channel
use for those hotels that adopted Booking.com already. The results show that chain hotels
use both Booking.com and the direct channel more intensively by 4.8 pp in the span of the
observation period. Compared to the intensive channel use at the beginning of 2016 which
is around 90 percent for both channels, this implies that chain hotels make 5.2 percent
more use of Booking.com and the direct channel. Similarly, the results suggest that the
independent hotels in Germany make 2.4 percent more use of Booking.com relative to an
initial channel use of around 95 percent.
The narrow BPC required the direct online channel price not to be lower than the price
at Booking.com. Now hotels publish their prices more often also at Booking.com. This
might be the case because it is possible to be visible at Booking.com and to set lower
prices at the direct channel than at Booking.com at the same time, while before part of
the hotels might just not have published offers at Booking.com in such instances.
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Table 8: Intensive channel use (if used at the beginning of observation period)
No chain Chain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Booking.com Direct Booking.com
Trend (Base: Germany) −0.33 0.18∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
∆ Trend France −1.33∗∗ −0.08 −0.36∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05)
∆ Trend Italy −3.13∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.39∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.06) (0.17) (0.11)
∆ Trend Sweden −0.35 −0.10 −0.57∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.78) (0.07) (0.22) (0.06)
∆ Trend Austria −0.28 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39 0.28∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.09) (0.24) (0.11)
∆ Trend Canada −0.43 −0.19∗∗∗ −0.22∗ −0.04
(0.54) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.58 0.02 −0.32 −0.08
(0.60) (0.05) (0.24) (0.07)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.43∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating −0.29 0.68 −0.71 −0.83
(3.50) (0.53) (1.13) (0.86)
GT city −0.17∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GT Booking.com −0.16∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
7 days before 1.51∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
14 days before 2.01∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ −0.09
(0.28) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
21 days before 2.23∗∗∗ 0.10 0.51∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.32) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
28 days before 2.56∗∗∗ −0.09 0.54∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.35) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 755,437 11,375,241 2,967,784 4,909,284
R2 0.510 0.233 0.273 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.509 0.232 0.273 0.119
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) not reported. Only observations of hotels in-
cluded that have used the particular channel already at the beginning of the obser-
vation period. Dependent variables are equal to 100 if particular channel is present
at Kayak request and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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7 Robustness checks
We summarize our various robustness checks in this section. In Subsection 7.1, we look
at within-year variations, including possible seasonality effects. In 7.2, we analyze long-
term trends that our Kayak data cannot fully capture. In 7.3 we elaborate on potential
measurement errors in the Kayak data.
7.1 Potential parallel developments and seasonality
Our identifying assumption for our empirical investigation is that the distinct development
in Germany relative to the other countries is attributable to the removal of Booking.com’s
narrow BPC in Germany. In order to substantiate our claim that no other country-specific
developments other than the BPC drive our result, we conduct the following robustness
checks.
First, we address the possibility that country-specific seasonality is responsible for the
observed results with a specification that allows more flexibly for country-specific seasonal
developments than the linear trend. By estimating two-month indicators for each country,
we can directly compare the base period of the beginning of 2016 with the first period
in 2017. This comparison yields a seasonality-adjusted measure of our estimates. The
results are comparable to those obtained for the linear trend specification (see Annex
VIII).
Second, we restrict the sample to the period January to July 2016 in order to look for
short term effects. In addition, we also focus on hotels that change their listing or pricing
behavior and run regressions without hotel fixed effects. Again, the results are comparable
to the main specification (see Annex VII).
Finally, we investigate the comparability of the initial listing frequencies of Booking.com
in Germany and the control group. In the spirit of a matching approach, we show that the
results with respect to the listing frequencies of prices at Booking.com are also obtained
when restricting the control group to cities which had a comparable listing frequency as
the German cities initially in our observation period. This provides a strong indication
that the developments in Germany are not just a simple “catch-up” process due to possibly
different initial listing frequencies of hotels across countries (see Annex VI).
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7.2 Long term trends
The Kayak data that we use in our analysis covers the period January 2016 to January
2017. In order to address the concern that the developments found in our Kayak analysis
might be due to longer term trends that started before our observation period, we also
compare developments in the relevant outcomes for the different countries prior to our
Kayak observation period.
To substantiate the finding that the ban of Booking.com’s BPC in Germany led to an
increase in hotel registrations on Booking.com, we collected registration dates of the hotels
in our sample directly from Booking.com.45 This allows us to study the development of
registrations by hotels on Booking.com for Germany, Austria, France and the other main
countries as a moving three-month average in Figure 3. Similar to the Kayak data plots
in Figure 2, there is a sharp increases in the number of newly registering hotels Germany
in 2016. This increase is clearly higher than any increase in the previous five years. This
also confirms that the evolution of listing frequencies as observed at the meta-search site
Kayak is plausible. Another sharp increase can be observed in France slightly earlier.
This might be related to the removal of all BPCs in France by law in the second half of
2015. More importantly, the graph suggests for the remainder that the developments of
registrations are similar across time and countries.
Furthermore, we study the development of the popularity of Booking.com over time for
each country in Figure 4. The graphs confirm that there is no obvious Germany-specific
development in the popularity of Booking.com from the customer perspective, when com-
paring across time and country. This reassures us that our main results are not driven by
a longer term trend which is not fully captured in our Kayak data.
45For this, we queried the website Booking.com directly for the same set of travel destinations in
September 2016 over a time period of four weeks. We subsequently accessed the respective hotel profile
websites on Booking.com and gathered the official entry date (". . . has been welcoming Booking.com
guests since. . . ") as of the 30th of September.
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7.3 Measurement error
One may be concerned whether there is a potential measurement error in the Kayak
prices. For example, in response to one of our Kayak requests, Kayak might return the
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up to date price of Booking.com but a slightly older price for the direct channel, where
in the meantime the actual price has changed. To assess the potential impact of such a
potential measurement error, recall that we conduct two different types of analysis:
1. We study whether a hotel makes any offers available on certain channels at a certain
point in time at all or not (Section 6). For this analysis it is not critical whether
Kayak compares exactly the same offers.
2. We compare prices across distribution channels (Section 5). For this analysis it is
relevant that we can make a meaningful comparison.
In order to address the concern that the availability and price structure of hotel room offers
as displayed at Kayak are measured accurately, we manually conducted a comparison of
prices and qualitative features between hotel offers on www.kayak.de with the offers on
the websites of the major OTAs. The comparison sample includes 171 booking requests
for travel dates ranging from June to August 2016. With regard to the order of prices
across channels, we find that the price leader among qualitatively comparable offers is
correctly detected by Kayak in more than 90% of all cases. Furthermore, we have not
found patterns in the deviations that indicate a favorable treatment of a particular channel
by Kayak. For a detailed description of the validation analysis see Annex II. Reassured by
our checks, we eventually base our analysis on the assumption that Kayak is comparing
equal offers with each other as this is the core of the business model of a price comparison
site.
We cannot rule out though that there might still be differences across the offers in some
of the cases even though Kayak posts these prices for comparison. Even if there are some
differences across the offers, our analyses of the different price changes across countries
are still valid as long as these unobserved differences between offers do not change over
time in a way that is mistakenly interpreted as a change due to the BPCs. For instance,
for the result of the direct channel having the strictly lowest price more often once the
BPC is removed to be flawed, it would need to be the case that Kayak in the year 2016
increasingly often wrongly presented the direct channel price as the lowest price, but only




Motivated by recent proceedings against best price clauses imposed by online travel agents,
we have empirically investigated the effects of such clauses using meta-search price data of
nearly 30,000 hotels in various countries from January 2016 to January 2017. We capture
the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany during our observation period,
so that we are able to particularly address the competitive effects of narrow BPCs.
We have found that more hotels publish prices at Booking.com in Germany follow-
ing the removal of the narrow BPC (extensive margin), and hotels which already used
Booking.com before publish offers more frequently there (intensive margin). These are
Germany-specific trends which distinctively differ from the main developments in the con-
trol group. In addition, more independent hotels, which initially often did not make direct
channel prices available at Kayak, start doing so more often in Germany once the BPC
of Booking.com is removed. Consistent with having posted direct prices more often on
Kayak before, chain hotels in Germany increase the frequency of listing direct channel
prices once the BPC is removed. These results indicate that hotels increasingly promote
the direct channel when they are not constrained by Booking.com’s narrow BPC.
We also find that chain hotels in Germany more frequently set the direct online channel
price below all other online prices available at Kayak once the BPCs are removed in
Germany. Again, this trend differs from the main developments in the control group.
This suggests that Booking.com’s narrow BPC did indeed restrict the hotel’s price setting.
We do not observe such a trend for independent hotels, which is consistent with the
observation that independent hotels already initially had a direct channel price below
the price of Booking.com much more often than chain hotels, indicating a higher non-
compliance with BPCs.
More generally, across the different countries and BPC regimes, the observed direct chan-
nel prices are below the prices at Booking.com in a significant fraction of the cases. Even
when accounting for the possibility that the Kayak data is imprecise to some degree, the
numbers suggest that there could be a significant non-compliance with the existing price
parity clauses. While the degree of non-compliance appears to be rather similar across the
different European countries with narrow BPCs and without BPCs, it appears to be sig-
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nificantly lower in Canada – the only country in our data set where the major OTAs still
use wide BPCs. This could be interpreted as an indication that the original wide BPCs
are more effective in disciplining the price setting of hotels than the narrow clauses. To
see this note that the narrow BPCs of Booking.com in Europe (and indirectly of Expedia
which aligned its clauses) are the result of commitments that Booking.com gave to the
competition authorities of France, Italy and Sweden. These commitments include certain
clauses that prevent Booking.com from enforcing compliance with the narrow BPCs.46
Moreover, the prominent policy actions against the OTAs might have discouraged OTAs
in Europe to actually enforce the clauses and similarly might have encouraged part of the
hoteliers to not comply.
As prohibitions of BPCs generally aim at enhancing OTA competition, one would expect
to observe changes in the commission rates that hotels have to pay for every mediated
booking. Yet, to our knowledge, the standard commission rates of the major OTAs
have not changed since the competition policy interventions in Europe.47 One reason
could be that the effects of BPCs are limited overall. To the extent that hotels did not
comply the parity clauses or that the clauses were not binding because hotels charged
higher direct prices than OTA prices, it is natural that their abolition had limited effects.
Another reason for why the standard commission rates have not yet changed could be
that the large OTAs can sustain such commission rates nowadays also without parity
clauses. For instance, the OTAs might have incentives to not create evidence in the sense
that commission rates decrease in countries without parity clauses in view of the ongoing
evaluation of the sector by competition authorities.
We see scope for more empirical research with respect to best price clauses of online
travel agents. Future empirical research should assess the long term effects and welfare
implications of BPCs, including the level of consumer prices as well as possible changes
in the effective commission rates of online travel agents.
46Such measures could include e.g. de-listing of non-compliant hotels. See Section 4 of the Booking.com
commitments (last accessed December 1, 2017;
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/news/13_596_bookingdotcom-commitment.pdf).
47See Annex III for details.
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Annex I: Countries and cities covered in data set
Tables 9 until 13 show the selected countries and cities covered in our data set. Data
collection started for the 25 biggest German cities (Table 10) and a control sample of 20
pairs of German and non-German cities along the German border (Table 11) in January
2016. In order to cover all three different BPC regimes in the data and to gather data for
countries in which future decisions on BPC are possible, the additional countries depicted
in Table 9 were subsequently included. For these countries, we chose a composition of the
fifteen biggest cities and fifteen largest travel destinations with the objective to gather
representative data across touristic and urban destinations for these countries.
Table 9: Countries covered in data set
Country Cities covered Start
Germany 25 biggest cities 25/01/2016
Various 20 pairs of cities near German border 27/01/2016
Italy 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 10/02/2016
Sweden 15 biggest cities and 14 tourist destinations 12/02/2016
Canada 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 12/02/2016
France 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 18/02/2016
Austria 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 20/04/2016
Table 10: Germany - TOP 25 cities
Germany TOP 25 cities
Berlin Stuttgart Leipzig Bochum Karlsruhe
Hamburg Dusseldorf Dresden Wuppertal Mannheim
Munich Dortmund Hanover Bielefeld Augsburg
Cologne Essen Nuremberg Bonn Wiesbaden
Frankfurt am Main Bremen Duisburg Munster Gelsenkirchen
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Table 11: Twin cities along German border
Pair German City Non-German neighbor Country of neighbor
1 Flensburg Kolding Denmark
2 Puttgarden/Fehmarn Rodby Denmark
3 Wilhelmshaven Groningen The Netherlands
4 Borkum Schiermonnikoog The Netherlands
5 Rheine Enschede The Netherlands
6 Aachen Maastricht The Netherlands
7 Heringsdorf Wolin Poland
8 Greifswald Stettin Poland
9 Cottbus Zielona-Gora Poland
10 Trier Rosport Luxembourg
11 Monschau Eupen Belgium
12 Pruem St. Vith Belgium
13 Saarbrücken Metz France
14 Karlsruhe Strasbourg France
15 Freiburg Basel Switzerland
16 Konstanz St. Gallen Switzerland
17 Oberstdorf Bad Ischl Austria
18 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Innsbruck Austria
19 Nuremberg Pilsen Czech Republic
20 Dresden Prague Czech Republic
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Table 12: Cities covered in data set
Italy Canada France Sweden Austria
Biggest Cities
Rome Toronto Paris Stockholm Vienna
Milan Montreal Marseille Göteborg Graz
Naples Vancouver Lyon Malmö Linz
Turin Calgary Toulouse Uppsala Salzburg
Palermo Edmonton Nice Västeras Innsbruck
Genoa Ottawa Nantes Örebro Klagenfurt
Bologna Québec Strasbourg Linköping Villach
Florence Winnipeg Montpellier Helsingborg Wels
Bari Hamilton Bordeaux Jönköping St. Pölten
Catania Kitchener Lille Norrköping Dornbirn
Venice London Rennes Lund Wiener Neustadt
Verona Victoria Reims Umea Steyr
Messina Saint Catharines Le Havre Gävle Feldkirch
Padua Halifax Saint-Étienne Boras Bregenz
Trieste Oshawa Toulon Eskilstuna Leonding
Tourist Destinations
Lecce Regina Grenoble Växjö Zell am See
Viareggio St. John’s Cannes Lulea Kitzbühel
Matera Fredericton Chambéry Falun Bad Hofgastein
Sanremo Charlotte Town Annecy Varberg Hermagor
Mantova Whitehorse Aix-les-Bains Visby Schladming
Vasto Yellowknife Menton Ystad Mittelberg
Merano Niagara On The Lake Albertville Kiruna Neustift
Caltagirone Whistler Bayeux Strömstad Bad Gastein
Montecatini
Terme
Banff Argelès-sur-Mer Ronneby Velden am Wörther
See
Narni Jasper Chamonix Jokkmokk Finkenstein am
Faaker See
Abano Terme Tofino Évian-les-Bains Grebbestad Kirchberg in Tirol
Ischia Dawson City Cavalaire-sur-
Mer
Marstrand St. Kanzian
Monte Argentario Churchill Saint-Gervais-
les-Bains
Jukkasjärvi Mayrhofen






Selection of travel destinations
For Italy, Sweden, Canada, France and Austria we selected the travel destinations in two
steps. First, we looked up the fifteen biggest cities in terms of population on Wikipedia re-
spectively. Additionally, for each country, we collected information about popular tourist
destinations from travel guides and official tourism websites. We then ordered all these
destinations by population and took again the fifteen biggest locations. For Italy, France,
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Sweden and Canada the websites were all accessed in January and February 2016. The
Austrian cities were selected in April 2016 after the Austrian competition authority an-
nounced to proceed against the narrow BPC later in 2016.
The sources of the travel destinations can be found in Table 13.
Table 13: Sources for travel destination selection
Country Type Source
Italy Listing of health resorts wikipedia.de
Ten most popular beaches telegraph.co.uk
Beyond Rome and Florence: 12
alternative Italian destinations
cnn.com
Sweden Top 10 Places in Sweden neverstoptraveling.com
Top 10 Green Attractions visitsweden.com
Canada Travelers Choice tripadvisor.com
Tourist attractions planetware.com
Places to Go de-keepexploring.canada.travel
France The top 10 beach holidays telegraph.co.uk
Travelers Choice Destinations tripadvisor.com
16 Top-Rated Tourist Attractions in
the French Alps
planetware.com
Austria Most popular winter destinations austriatourism.at
Most popular summer destinations austriatourism.at
Annex II: Validation of Kayak data
Kayak’s business model aims at comparing hotel room offers of different distribution
channels. We understand that Kayak derives revenue from referring customers to the
websites of OTAs or other booking providers. As such it should seek to offer customers
a convenient and reliable comparison facility. In order to facilitate the comparison of
hotel offers, Kayak collects general information on room types, bed types and booking
conditions from the different distribution channels and displays them to the customer
when clicking on the detailed overview for one particular hotel. As mentioned in Section
3.1, in order to validate the accuracy of the offers listed on Kayak, we have compared
prices and qualitative features of 171 hotels on Kayak with corresponding offers on the
websites of the major OTAs and the hotel websites.
We generated our validation sample as follows. From all hotels that we observed in our
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data we took a random draw of 115 hotels. We augmented the sample with 56 hotels
from Germany, Austria and Sweden that we observed to frequently offer a direct sales
channel on Kayak. We did this to obtain more observations with direct channel prices as
well as HRS prices and to have a better coverage of the countries Germany, Austria and
Sweden. Consequently, the sample consists of observations from Canada, Italy, Sweden,
Germany, Austria and France plus a few observations for the Czech Republic, Switzerland
and Poland. For 40 hotels of our sample Kayak did not display any information during
the enquiry period for various travel dates.
From the overview page for a particular hotel on Kayak, we obtain room rates for all
available sales channels and information on room features (e.g. double bed) and booking
conditions (e.g. free cancellation, free breakfast, etc.). In cases where Kayak displayed
several offers for one single distribution channel (e.g. if Kayak displays the offers for a
two-bed room and for a three-bed room on Expedia), we focus the analysis on the offer
with the same qualitative features as on the other distribution channels. We used the
forwarding links on the Kayak website to reach the corresponding offer on the OTAs and
the hotel websites.
With the gathered data we conducted two kinds of consistency validations. First, we
compare prices and qualitative characteristics of a room offer on Kayak with the cor-
responding offer on the OTAs or on the hotel website. Second, we verify whether the
price structure between the major OTAs and the direct sales channel shown on Kayak is
consistent with the price structure on OTAs and hotel websites. In eight cases (9% of all
observations with at least two distribution channels on Kayak) the qualitative features as
displayed on Kayak differed across the distribution channels.48 As prices are not compa-
rable across channels in these cases, the observations are excluded from the analysis of
the price structure.
As shown in Table 14 we observe that prices coincide in more than two-thirds of all
observations on both sources. For this comparison, we have assumed that prices coincide
if the difference amounts to less than three EUR in order to capture differences in rounding
and exchange rates.49 For deviating prices, the data suggest that prices on Kayak most
48Deviations are due to different cancellation policies or the inclusion of breakfast and do not seem to
affect room offers or sales channels systematically.
49Expedia displays an exact amount including euros and cents for a hotel room, while Booking.com
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often are higher than the prices on OTAs and websites and that only in a few cases
prices on Kayak are lower than on the actual sales channel. The sales channel that is
measured most accurately is the direct sales channel. On average, prices on Kayak and
prices on the OTAs or the hotel websites deviate from each other by approximately five
EUR. Comparing the room features and booking conditions on both sources, we found
that this information on Kayak is identical with the information provided on the OTA or
the hotel website, whenever rooms were available on both sources.








Booking.com 106 26% 69% 5%
Expedia 64 34% 66% 0%
HRS 34 29% 68% 3%
Direct channel 51 12% 80% 8%
In order to ensure comparability among sales channels in the second consistency valida-
tion, we only compared hotel offers of different sales channels with each other if these
offers were qualitatively identical. In more than 90% the offers find qualitatively com-
parable room offers regarding room features and booking conditions on the distribution
channels. Among these offers we identify a price leadership whenever the lowest price is
at least 1 EUR lower than the second lowest price. Table 15 shows that the information
whether one sales channel is the price leader (i.e. offers a price strictly lower than the
second best and qualitatively identical offer) is consistent between Kayak and the actual
sales channels in approximately 90% of the cases. If there is a distinct price leader the
average difference between the lowest price and the second lowest price is around 7.50
EUR both on Kayak and on the sales channels.
Table 15: Consistency of price leadership




Direct channel 39 89%
usually adjusts prices upwards to the next integer. Moreover, prices from Sweden or Canada sometimes
were displayed in domestic currencies. For the sake of comparability, we converted the prices in EUR
using the exchange rate of the booking date (Source: www.finanzen.net/waehrungsrechner/).
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Annex III: Evidence on commission rates of OTAs
We understand that major OTAs such as Booking.com and Expedia use an agency model
where hotels set room prices on the OTA and pay a commission to the OTA for every
realized booking via the OTA. We understand that effective commissions are determined
by a standard rate plus an additional fee if hotels want to appear higher in the OTA’s
ranking.50 The interventions against BPCs aimed at removing restraints of competition
among OTAs in commission rates. However, the recent interventions have not obviously
led to significant changes in the OTAs’ commission rates so far. A recent Europe-wide
survey by HOTREC finds that for more than 90% of all hotels the effective commission
rates have not decreased over the past one year.51 Our anecdotal examination (including
interviews with hoteliers) in the course of 2016 indicates that basis commission rates of
the major OTAs range between 12% and 18% in Europe. While we took note of basis
commissions of 15% at Expedia and HRS, Booking.com’s basis commissions apparently
vary across destinations (see Table 16 for the observations). Similarly, the Bundeskartel-
lamt reported in the decisions regarding HRS52 and Booking.com53 that in 2013 and in
2015 the major OTAs’ basis commission rates range from 10% to 15%. This also indicates
that in Germany (basis) commissions have not changed in the last years.
Table 16: Booking.com’s standard commissions by destination
Dusseldorf Berlin Termoli Rome Orebro Stockholm Toulouse Paris
12% 15% 15% 18% 15% 15% 17% 15%
According to the Bundeskartellamt, effective commissions can account for up to 50% of
the room price.54 In 2015, the German hotel association estimated average commissions
payments to range between 20% and 25%.55
50For example via Expedia’s hotel accelerator program that sells higher ranking positions by auc-
tion (see https://skift.com/2016/03/03/first-look-at-expedias-hotel-accelerator-program-for-improving-
hotel-placement/; last accessed December 1, 2017) or Booking.com’s preferred partner program (see
http://www.booking.com/content/hotel-help.de.html; last accessed December 1, 2017).
51HOTREC survey on online platforms of 2016 (see http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-
1714/dominant-online-platforms-gaining-market-share-in-travel-trade-no-signs-of-increased-competition-
between-online-travel-agents-unveils-european-hotel-distribution-study.aspx; last accessed December 1,
2017).
52Bundeskartellamt (2013) B9-66-10 Par. 225
53Bundeskartellamt (2015) B9-121-13 Par. 18.
54Bundeskartellamt (2015) B9-121-13 Par. 2.
55Statement of the German hotel association from August 31, 2015 according to Bundeskartellamt
(2015) B9-121-13, Fn 414.
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Annex IV: Public decisions with respect to BPCs of
OTAs in Europe





01/2014 UK OFT OFT decision






Decision of 20.12.2013, B 9 – 66/10






commitment to at most
narrow BPCs with effect
of July 2015














Decision of 21.04.2015 – I779 –
Booking.com
2015 UK Court decision
OFT decision was
annulled on appeal on
procedural grounds
CMA press release, 16.09.2015,
CMA closes hotel online booking
investigation.a
07/2015 EU/EEA Expedia
Announces to use narrow
BPCs in Europe
Expedia press release 01.07.2015;
„Expedia Amends Rate, Conditions




Law that prohibits BPCs


















prohibit narrow BPCs for
OTAs in Austria by
January 2017
Nationalrat, decision of 18.10.2016







Decision of 29.11.2016 - No. RG:
2014027403 - Booking.com
aSee https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-closes-hotel-online-booking-investigation, last accessed Decem-
ber 1, 2017
bSee http://www.expediainc.com/news-release/?aid=123242&fid=99&yy=2015, last accessed December 1, 2017
cSee http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Article/16460/Frances-end-to-rate-parity-creates-grey-areas, last accessed
December 1, 2017 50
Annex V: Definition of OTAs and direct sales channels
In our data set, we observe 76 distinct sales channels that list hotel rooms on Kayak.
These can be classified into OTAs like Booking.com, and the direct hotel channel. Taking
together all hotel offers out of all Kayak requests, we observe in total more than 108
million price offers. Table 18 lists the 15 most observed sales channels that account for
almost 90% of all observed price offers. Booking.com is the most frequent channel in our
data set accounting for 17% of all price observations.
Table 18: Sales channels observed on Kayak

















It is noteworthy that the well-known OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS belong to
company groups which own further OTAs (Table 21). Together the three company groups
account for more than two-thirds of our price observations. For these Kayak requests
in which two OTAs of the same company group are observed together (column 4), we
computed how often the prices are identical (column 5).
As a benchmark, we also compared the primary OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS
in Tables 19 and 20. Table 19 shows how frequently the OTAs appear together in one
Kayak request. For those Kayak requests in which two OTAs are observed together, we
find that prices are equal in less than 50% (Table 20).
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HRS 4,669,818 4,305,990 5,338,770




HRS 52% 46% 100%
We conducted the same analysis with OTAs belonging to the same company group. The
OTA Agoda that belongs to the Priceline Group appears in more than 80% with the
primary website Booking.com. For the OTAs belonging to Expedia Inc. (Hotels.com,
Venere, ebookers) the mutual appearance with the primary website Expedia is at almost
100% of all observations. The Expedia website prices are also very often equal to the prices
at Hotels.com and Venere,56 which suggests to treat them as one entity. For ebookers an
abrupt change in pricing policy can be observed between May and June 2016. While
ebookers used to have a price parity with Expedia in only 18% of all Kayak requests until
May, this value increased in June and July to 90%. Therefore, also Expedia and ebookers
is treated as one entity.
Interestingly, the correspondence between Booking.com and Agoda is quite low. As a
consequence, we treat them as separate OTAs. Finally, we also treat HRS and Hotel.de
as separate as the mutual appearance between HRS and Hotel.de is at only 39% and also
the coherence is only moderate.
56Note that the OTA Venere is observed on Kayak only in January and February 2016.
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Table 21: Price coherence within company groups









Booking.com 17% 100% 100%
Agoda 5% 87% 38%
Expedia Inc.
Expedia 15% 100% 100%
Hotels.com 15% 98% 90%
Venere 1% 98% 98%
ebookers 10% 98% 75%
HRS Robert
Ragge GmbH
HRS 5% 100% 100%
Hotel.de 1% 39% 71%
Annex VI: Robustness check: Increase of Booking.com’s
listing frequency in Germany
The Booking.com price publication frequency in Germany starts from a considerably lower
level than the frequencies in the other countries at the beginning of the observation period
in 2016 (Figure 2). One might, therefore, wonder whether the increase in the publication
frequencies of Booking.com in Germany can be fully attributed to the prohibition of its
narrow BPC by the Bundeskartellamt.
An alternative hypothesis could be that Booking.com might undergo a general catch-up
process in regions where it is less established. To descriptively verify the robustness of
our result, we conducted a comparison between the evolvement of Booking.com’s listing
frequency in Germany and in a control group. The control group consists of nine non-
German cities that, on average, exhibit the same Booking.com listing frequency as it can
be observed in Germany at the beginning of 2016. The cities of the control group were
selected as follows:
At the city-level, we computed for every month the average Booking.com frequency.
Taking the nine non-German cities with the lowest Booking.com frequency in February
yields approximately the same average Booking.com frequency as for Germany as a whole
(74.5%, while 72.6% in Germany). These cities are Rome, Venice, Ischia (all Italy), Rodby
(Denmark), Dawson City, Yellowknife, Gananoque (Ottawa), Tofino, St. Catharines (all
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Canada). Figure 5 shows how weekly Booking.com frequencies evolve over time for the
two groups. In Germany the frequency increases sharply from 73% in February to 96%
in June and July and remains at the same level for most of the remaining observation
period. The listing frequency of the control sample has the same frequency level at the
beginning of the year. But in contrast to Germany, the Booking.com frequency of the
control sample does not show a similar increase and only fluctuates between 59% and 80%
during the whole observation period.
Hence, we conclude from the comparison of Germany with a control sample consisting of
nine cities from Europe and Canada that there is no general catch-up process in regions
with low Booking.com frequencies that drives the development in Germany. In turn,
this result is taken as supporting evidence that the abolition of Booking.com’s BPCs in
Germany can be contributed to the especially sharp increase of Booking.com listings in
Germany.
Figure 5: Booking.com Frequency (Germany and control group)
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A related regression on the intensive channel use of the direct channel and Booking.com
with the control sample reveals the same result as in the descriptive representation. The
intensive channel use of Booking.com increases significantly while the significant and
negative trend deviations for the other countries show that the trend in the control sample
is in total approximately zero.
Table 23: Intensive channel use
(1) (2)
Direct Booking.com
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.19∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.08)
∆ Trend Italy −0.17∗∗∗ −2.37∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.14)
∆ Trend Canada −0.06 −1.99∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.38)
∆ Trend Denmark −0.72∗∗∗ −4.08∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.17)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.08∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating 0.08 2.49∗∗
(0.34) (1.27)
GT city −0.01∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
GT Booking.com −0.00 0.25∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
7 days before 0.05 −0.13
(0.03) (0.08)
14 days before 0.08∗∗ 0.04
(0.03) (0.09)
21 days before 0.11∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.04) (0.10)
28 days before 0.13∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.11)
Weekdays Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes
Observations 6,515,918 6,515,918
R2 0.880 0.404
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.404
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. De-
pendent variables are equal to 100 if particular channel
is present at Kayak request and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Annex VII: Robustness check: Split samples and hotel
characteristics
We test the robustness of our main regression results concerning three variations to the
main specification (Table 24 until Table 29). Column 1 reports the main specification as
in Sections 5 and 6 for comparison. In general, we find that our results are robust with
respect to different specifications.
In column 2, we restrict the observation period to the time frame between January 2016
and July 2016. Recall from Figure 2 that we observe a strong adaption process of the
Booking.com listing frequency shortly after the removal of the narrow BPC. In line with
this observation, the regression coefficients for the German-specific trend for our main
dependent variables of interest are larger in magnitude than the coefficients for the main
regression which takes data until January 2017 into account.
There is a share of hotels that exhibit no variation in the dependent variables during the
observation period. Therefore we seek in column 3 to identify the fraction of hotels that
indeed react to the removal of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany by changing their
listing or pricing strategy.57 To do so, we drop all observations from hotels that do not
change their strategy during the observation period. By definition, these hotels exhibit
a zero time trend and we find that coefficients are larger in magnitude than those in the
main regressions.
Finally, in column 4, we report the main regression without hotel fixed effects. In turn,
we are able to include the time-invariant observed hotel characteristics, like the number of
rooms and the stars.58 Even though the significance level and the sign of the coefficients
generally coincide with the main regression, we find differences in the magnitude of the
coefficients. This finding reassures us that we are able to capture unobserved heterogeneity
by employing hotel fixed effects.
57For the regressions on the Kayak request level (intensive channel use and price leadership) the share
of hotels that does not change their strategy ranges between 0.1% (direct channel as price leader) and 12%
(Booking.com as distribution channel). For the regressions on the extensive channel use these figures are
considerably higher as the unit of observation is on the hotel-month level. Accordingly, all hotels that use,
for example, Booking.com at least once every month, in which we observe them, exhibit no variation in
the dependent variable “Extensive Booking.com use”. Only 5% (Booking.com) and 18% (direct channel)
of all hotel-month observations exhibit variation in this respect.
58The time-invariant characteristics are centered (cent) around the mean.
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Table 24: Robustness check - Price leadership of direct channel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.30∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10)
∆ Trend France −0.69∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13)
∆ Trend Italy −0.35∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.29) (0.17) (0.19)
∆ Trend Sweden −1.66∗∗∗ −2.59∗∗∗ −1.66∗∗∗ −1.62∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.42) (0.29) (0.27)
∆ Trend Austria −0.34 −0.62 −0.34 −1.25∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.49) (0.22) (0.32)
∆ Trend Canada −0.20∗ −0.98∗∗∗ −0.20∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.12)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.50∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.34) (0.18) (0.22)
Share of non-listed hotels 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Kayak hotel rating (centered) 0.40 −0.63 0.37 3.80∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.30) (1.01) (0.58)
GT city 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
GT Booking.com 0.01 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.00













Hotel category in stars (centered) −0.93∗
(0.53)




Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days before travel date Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 2,968,019 1,792,366 2,964,607 2,921,753
R2 0.426 0.461 0.426 0.028
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.460 0.425 0.028
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes
no hotel fixed effects and controls for all observed hotel characteristics that are centered
around the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 if direct channel is price leader and 0
otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 25: Robustness check - Price leadership of Booking.com
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) −0.14∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
∆ Trend France 0.22∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
∆ Trend Italy 0.27∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08)
∆ Trend Sweden 0.07 −1.10∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.01
(0.11) (0.27) (0.11) (0.13)
∆ Trend Austria −0.28∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.22
(0.10) (0.28) (0.10) (0.15)
∆ Trend Canada 0.09 −0.11 0.08 0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)
∆ Trend Other countries 0.40∗∗∗ −0.12 0.40∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.02∗∗ −0.00 −0.01∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating (centered) 2.20∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 0.43
(0.82) (1.04) (0.82) (0.27)
GT city 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GT Booking.com 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗













Hotel category in stars (centered) −0.88∗∗∗
(0.21)




Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days before travel date Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 2,904,221 1,762,803 2,889,402 2,857,448
R2 0.147 0.165 0.144 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.164 0.143 0.022
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes
no hotel fixed effects and controls for all observed hotel characteristics that are centered
around the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 if Booking.com is price leader and 0
otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 26: Robustness check - Extensive direct channel use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.06∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.54) (0.05)
∆ Trend France 0.05 −0.16∗∗ −0.20 −0.05
(0.04) (0.07) (0.65) (0.05)
∆ Trend Italy −0.12∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −3.04∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.71) (0.03)
∆ Trend Sweden −0.10 −0.33∗∗∗ −2.83 −0.32∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (1.88) (0.08)
∆ Trend Austria −0.02 0.66∗∗∗ −0.94 −0.15∗
(0.06) (0.16) (0.92) (0.09)
∆ Trend Canada −0.08∗ −0.16∗ −1.77∗ −0.13∗
(0.04) (0.09) (1.07) (0.07)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.01 −0.20∗∗ −0.07 −0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (1.26) (0.06)
Avg. share of non-listed hotels −0.00 0.00 −0.13 −0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
Avg. Kayak hotel rating (centered) 0.36 0.38 9.37 −0.20
(0.24) (0.30) (7.07) (0.23)
Avg. GT city 0.00 −0.00 0.04 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
Avg. GT Booking.com −0.00∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.08 −0.08∗∗∗













Hotel category in stars (centered) 5.16∗∗∗
(0.33)




Weekdays No No No No
Days before travel date No No No No
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 283,389 150,446 13,443 272,856
R2 0.946 0.958 0.379 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.940 0.949 0.319 0.203
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes no
hotel fixed effects and controls for all observed hotel characteristics that are centered around
the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 for all months in which a hotel used the direct
channel at least once and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 27: Robustness check - Extensive Booking.com use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) 1.80∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗ 7.20∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.05)
∆ Trend France −0.92∗∗∗ −1.87∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.16) (0.23) (0.07)
∆ Trend Italy −0.21∗∗∗ 0.13 −0.79∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.17) (0.20) (0.07)
∆ Trend Sweden −1.97∗∗∗ −3.50∗∗∗ −8.53∗∗∗ −1.87∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.13) (0.91) (0.07)
∆ Trend Austria −1.08∗∗∗ −1.97∗∗∗ −1.83∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.24) (0.42) (0.09)
∆ Trend Canada −1.82∗∗∗ −3.30∗∗∗ −7.23∗∗∗ −1.69∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.52) (0.07)
∆ Trend Other countries −1.80∗∗∗ −3.55∗∗∗ −6.59∗∗∗ −1.70∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.14) (0.46) (0.06)
Avg. share of non-listed hotels −0.11∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01)
Avg. Kayak hotel rating (centered) 1.57∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.81) (1.70) (0.15)
Avg. GT city −0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.03∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Avg. GT Booking.com 0.14∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗













Hotel category in stars (centered) −0.24∗
(0.13)




Weekdays No No No No
Days before travel date No No No No
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 283,389 150,446 51,082 272,856
R2 0.516 0.631 0.405 0.057
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.550 0.345 0.057
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes no
hotel fixed effects and controls for all observed hotel characteristics that are centered around
the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 for all months in which a hotel used Booking.com
at least once and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 28: Robustness check - Intensive direct channel use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.36∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.20∗
(0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11)
∆ Trend France −0.59∗∗∗ −2.30∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗
(0.12) (0.24) (0.12) (0.13)
∆ Trend Italy −1.33∗∗∗ −3.77∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.45) (0.20) (0.21)
∆ Trend Sweden −0.65∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗
(0.24) (0.32) (0.24) (0.26)
∆ Trend Austria −0.15 0.09 −0.15 0.62∗
(0.28) (0.72) (0.28) (0.38)
∆ Trend Canada −0.32∗∗ −1.28∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.27∗
(0.12) (0.24) (0.12) (0.14)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.92∗∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.53) (0.26) (0.33)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.31∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Kayak hotel rating (centered) −1.14 0.89 −1.13 1.69∗∗∗
(1.24) (1.39) (1.25) (0.63)
GT city −0.09∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
GT Booking.com −0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗













Hotel category in stars (centered) −0.13
(0.48)




Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days before travel date Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 3,723,221 2,270,745 3,715,121 3,651,769
R2 0.403 0.326 0.402 0.039
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.325 0.402 0.039
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes
no hotel fixed effects and controls for all observed hotel characteristics that are centered
around the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 if direct channel is present at Kayak
request and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 29: Robustness check - Intensive Booking.com use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main reg. Until July Strategy No FE
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.26∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Trend France −0.24∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
∆ Trend Italy −0.61∗∗∗ −1.22∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)
∆ Trend Sweden −0.04 −0.88∗∗∗ −0.04 0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Trend Austria 0.26∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09)
∆ Trend Canada −0.09∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
∆ Trend Other countries −0.03 −0.85∗∗∗ −0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.28∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating (centered) 0.39 1.18∗∗ 0.45 −0.33∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.60) (0.53) (0.12)
GT city −0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GT Booking.com 0.03∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗













Hotel category in stars (centered) 0.78∗∗∗
(0.12)




Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Days before travel date Yes Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 16,284,525 10,025,115 14,293,638 15,916,558
R2 0.207 0.224 0.199 0.033
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.222 0.198 0.033
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. (1) is the regression from the main
analysis aggregated for all hotel types. (2) only contains data until (end of) July 2016. (3)
excludes all hotels that exhibit no variation in the dep. variable ("strategy"). (4) includes
no hotel fixed effects and controls for observed hotel characteristics that are centered around
the mean. The dep. variable is equal to 100 if Booking.com is present at Kayak request
and 0 otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Annex VIII: Robustness check: Accounting for sea-
sonality with two-month indicators
In this robustness check we run our main regressions with two-month indicators instead of
a country-specific linear time trend. With this specification that pools independent and
chain hotels together, we allow for country-specific seasonality that goes beyond the main
specification with the linear time trend. Moreover, we can compare the realizations of the
dependent variables between the reference period (January 2016 and February 2016) to
the beginning of 2017, which yields a seasonality-corrected measure of our estimates. We
use both January and February 2016 as reference period because we only have a limited
coverage of January 2016. We compare this with January 2017 as our data set does not
cover February 2017. For the countries of comparison we only report the estimation results
for January 2017, which allows us to verify that the materialization of the dependent
variable at the end of our observation period generally coincides with the predictions
of the linear time trend. The results are in Tables 30 and 31. The comparison to the
results of the main regressions (which are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8) verifies that the
results are robust to a more flexible specification that allows for country-specific seasonal
trends. We conclude that the linear trend is an informative statistic for aggregating the
development of the dependent variables in the countries of investigation.
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Table 30: Two-month regressions direct channel
(1) (2) (3)
Ext. use Int. use Price leader
March April 2016 1.16∗∗∗ −0.23 1.62∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.65) (0.44)
May June 2016 1.12∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗ 5.22∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.69) (0.75)
July August 2016 0.99∗∗∗ 1.47∗ 4.91∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.81) (0.79)
September October 2016 1.18∗∗∗ 1.35 4.67∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.85) (0.78)
November December 2016 1.38∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.90) (0.90)
January 2017 0.83∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.95) (1.10)
January 2017 × France 0.80∗ −8.94∗∗∗ −4.37∗∗∗
(0.48) (1.28) (1.36)
January 2017 × Italy −1.40∗∗∗ −15.79∗∗∗ −3.88∗∗
(0.34) (2.06) (1.81)
January 2017 × Sweden −1.34∗ −6.79∗∗ −3.67∗
(0.75) (2.74) (2.04)
January 2017 × Austria 1.43 13.46∗∗∗ −0.01
(1.16) (4.34) (2.55)
January 2017 × Canada −0.89∗ −2.43∗∗ −4.08∗∗∗
(0.50) (1.24) (1.28)
January 2017 × Other countries −0.45 −8.85∗∗∗ −5.20∗∗
(0.56) (3.00) (2.11)
Avg. share of non-listed hotels −0.00
(0.00)
Avg. Kayak hotel rating 0.35
(0.24)
Avg. GT city 0.01∗∗
(0.00)
Avg. GT Booking.com −0.00
(0.00)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.32∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating −1.21 0.47
(1.24) (1.01)
GT city −0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
GT Booking.com −0.01 0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Weekdays No Yes Yes
Days before travel date No Yes Yes
Other two-month-country interactions Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283,389 3,723,221 2,968,019
R2 0.946 0.406 0.427
Adjusted R2 0.941 0.405 0.427
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. The data are aggregated for
all hotel types. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 31: Two-month regressions Booking.com
(1) (2) (3)
Ext. use Int. use Price leader
March April 2016 1.35∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.20) (0.19) (0.24)
May June 2016 16.80∗∗∗ −0.16 −1.03∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.18) (0.27)
July August 2016 16.73∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.17) (0.37)
September October 2016 17.91∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗
(0.57) (0.21) (0.38)
November December 2016 15.50∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −0.24
(0.63) (0.49) (0.45)
January 2017 16.38∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗ −2.39∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.26) (0.43)
January 2017 × France −6.84∗∗∗ −5.71∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.76) (0.37) (0.69)
January 2017 × Italy −4.13∗∗∗ −6.81∗∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.50) (0.97)
January 2017 × Sweden −14.94∗∗∗ −1.69∗∗ −2.16
(0.72) (0.67) (1.40)
January 2017 × Austria −11.91∗∗∗ 1.10 −6.09∗∗∗
(1.45) (0.89) (1.46)
January 2017 × Canada −16.88∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.46) (0.88)
January 2017 × Other countries −16.02∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.43) (1.62)
Avg. share of non-listed hotels −0.02∗∗
(0.01)
Avg. Kayak hotel rating 1.57∗∗∗
(0.50)
Avg. GT city −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
Avg. GT Booking.com 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01)
Share of non-listed hotels −0.27∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Kayak hotel rating 0.56 1.83∗∗
(0.46) (0.82)
GT city −0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
GT Booking.com 0.02∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Weekdays No Yes Yes
Days before travel date No Yes Yes
Other two-month-country interactions Yes Yes Yes
Popularity other OTAs Yes Yes Yes
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283,389 16,284,525 2,904,221
R2 0.530 0.209 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.208 0.149
Standard errors (clustered by hotel) in parentheses. The data are aggregated for
all hotel types. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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